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1.1 Introduction
The continuing evolution of the technology allows building increasingly complex
electronic devices integrating more and more functions. This evolution is not free
of problems, or more appropriate, challenges to overcome. An increasing source of
problems concerning the reliability of new technological processes is the perturbation
induced by energetic particles (the Single Event Effects(SEEs)). First applications
to incite some interest with respect to SEEs were obviously limited to specific ap-
plications: aero-space, high-reliability, nuclear facilities equipment and implantable
medical devices. However, technological advances make possible the continuous
diminution of the transistor size, rendering the components more sensitive to per-
turbations induced by radiation. Thus, is no longer possible to ignore Single Events
for future and present technologies working in a natural environment.
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The focus of this thesis is on soft error analysis and mitigation techniques for
very large circuits. The main contributions consist of advancement in the analysis
of Single Event Transient and Single Event Upset.
The manuscript is organized as follows. The first chapter is divided in two
parts, the first section provide an overview of the radiation environments where
microelectronic devices and integrated circuits may be used. The second section
presents the main single event effects with their triggering mechanism including
some basic notion of nuclear physics. Chapter 2 introduces the soft error analysis
methodology presenting the basic de-rating effects. In chapter 3 presents a detailed
Single Event Transient analysis flow, from the technology characterization to the
propagation analysis. Chapter 4 describes an advanced Single Event analysis for
sequential logic, including some considerations about the Single Event Transient
(SET) sensitivity of sequential cells. A low cost Single Event Upset (SEU) mitigation
solution was proposed and validated on a large (190kFF) design.
Chapter 5 presents the results of functional analysis of a single-core-implementation
of a complex commercial Central Processing Unit (CPU) counting about 250k Flip-
Flops. Three representative benchmarks were considered for this analysis. For each
benchmark scenario, three fault injection campaigns were performed. From the fault
injection results a mitigation scenario is proposed. The results obtained show that
the failure rates, both Silent Data Corruption (SDC) and Detectable Uncorrectable
Error (DUE), can be reduced considerably by hardening a limited percentage of
flip-flops instances.
This is followed, in chapter 6, by the conclusions and a discussion of plans for
future work. In addition to the main topics of the thesis, additional work performed
in the context of a collaborative project is presented in the appendix A: a technique
for the mitigation of flip-flop soft-errors through an optimization of the Temporal
De-Rating (TDR) is proposed.
Overall, the work presented in this manuscript seeks to propose new techniques
and methodologies in order to enable finer grained analysis of the effect of faults
while having industry-level performances.
1.2 Radiation Environments and Anomalies
Microelectronic devices and Integrated Circuits(ICs) can be exposed to a wide
range of radiation environments. The types of particles, their energies, fluxes, and
fluences (or total dose) can vary considerably among the different radiation environ-
ments that electronics devices can be exposed to. These differences can lead to large
variations in radiation-induced degradation. In this section, we present an overview
of the different radiation environments.
1.2.1 Space Radiation Environment
The concentrations and types of particles in the space environment vary signif-
icantly with altitude, angle of inclination and solar activity. As such, it is nearly
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impossible to define a typical space environment [Schwank 2008]. Particles present
in the space radiation environment include.
1. Particles trapped by the earth’s magnetic field - high energy particles (Galac-
tic Cosmic Rays (GCR) and Solar Particles) that are not deflected by the
magnetic field and become trapped in the planet’s magnetic field (Figure 1.1).
2. Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCR) - high-energy atomic nuclei coming outside the
solar system, from which all of the surrounding electrons have been stripped
away during their passage through the galaxy.
3. Solar Particle Events - high-energy nuclei that are associated with solar ac-
tivity, they are ejected from the Sun due to plasma heating, acceleration, and
numerous other forces.
1.2.1.1 Particles trapped by the earth’s magnetic field
The Earth’s magnetic field creates a geomagnetic cavity known as the magneto-
sphere [Faruk 2012] (Figure 1.1). The magnetic field lines trap low-energy charged
particles. These trapped particles consist primarily of electrons and protons, al-
though some heavy ions are also trapped.
Magnetosphere
Van Allen Belt
Figure 1.1: Solar wind and Earth’s magnetosphere.
The trapped particles gyrate spirally around the magnetic field lines and are
reflected back and forth between the poles where the fields are confined. The motion
of the trapped particles is illustrated in Figure 1.2 [Faruk 2012]. This motion of
charged particles forms bands of electrons and protons around the earth, which
constitute the two primary radiation belts (Figures 1.1, 1.3) or Van-Allen Belts.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
TRAJECTORY OF
TRAPPED PARTICLES
MIRROR POINT
DRIFT OF ELECTRONS
MAGNETIC FIELD LINE
DRIFT OF PROTONS
Figure 1.2: Motion of trapped particles in the earth’s magnetosphere [Faruk 2012].
Magnetic 
Axis
Rotational 
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Inner
Radiation
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Outer
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Inner
Radiation
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Outer
Radiation
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Figure 1.3: Van Allen radiation belts.
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The boundaries of these domains at the equator are illustrated in Figure 1.4
[Faruk 2012] 1. Because of variations in the magnetic field lines with latitude, the
boundaries of the radiation belts vary with latitude (angle of inclination). The do-
mains can be divided into five regions. Trapped protons exist primarily in regions
one and two that extend from slightly above 1 earth radius to 3.8 earth radii (pur-
ple bar in Figure 1.4 [Stassinopoulos 1988]). The distribution of proton flux as a
function of energy and radial distance is given in Figure 1.5 [Stassinopoulos 1988].
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Figure 1.4: Boundaries of the domains for solar flare and trapped protons and outer
and inner zone electrons [Faruk 2012].
Trapped protons in the earth’s magnetosphere can have energies as high as 500
MeV [Faruk 2012]. Note that the altitude corresponding to the peak in flux decreases
with proton energy. Protons with energies greater than 10 MeV primarily occupy
regions one and two [Faruk 2012]. Protons originating from solar flares are present
predominantly in regions four and five (Figure 1.4 [Stassinopoulos 1988]).
South Atlantic Anomaly Above the Atlantic Ocean centered off the coast of
South America, earth’s inner Van Allen radiation belt comes closest to the Earth’s
surface, causing a region of increased proton flux at relatively low altitudes. This
region is called the South Atlantic anomaly (SAA), and exists because Van Allen
radiation belts are aligned with the magnetic axis of the Earth, which is tilted by
11 degrees from the rotation axis of the Earth, and are not symmetrically placed
with respect to the Earth’s surface [Barth 1997].
In this region, the flux of protons with energies greater than 30MeV can be as
much as 104 times higher than in comparable altitudes over other regions of the
earth. At higher altitudes, the magnetic sphere is more uniform and the South
Atlantic Anomaly disappears [Barth 1997], [Petersen 1981]. Figure 1.6 shows maps
of the proton belt structure at altitudes of 500 km, 1000 km, and 3000 km, indicating
1Distances are specified in earth radii (one earth radius is equal to 6380 km) referenced to the
center of the earth, i.e., one earth radius is at the earth’s surface.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of proton flux as a function of energy and radial distance
[Stassinopoulos 1988].
the location of the SAA at low altitudes and the emergence of the background Van
Allen belt structure at 3000 km [Barth 1997].
Electrons are present predominantly from region one to region four [Faruk 2012].
The electron domain is divided into two zones, an inner outer zone (Figure 1.4). The
outer zone electrons have higher fluxes ( 10 times higher) and energies than the inner
zone electrons. The maximum energy of trapped electrons is approximately 7MeV
in the outer zone; whereas, the maximum energy is less than 5MeV for electrons in
the inner zone [Faruk 2012]. At these energies, electron interactions are not a threat
for single-event effects, but they must be considered for the total-dose effects.
Fluxes of electrons and protons in particular orbits can be estimated from exist-
ing models. The primary models of Earth’s radiation belts that are in widespread
use are AP-8 [Sawyer 1976] and AE-8 [Vette 1991]. The AP-8 models are of
trapped protons and include AP-8 MAX and AP-8 MIN, valid for periods of so-
lar maximum and solar minimum, respectively. The AE-8 models for trapped
electrons similarly include AE-8 MAX and AE-8 MIN. Experimental data indi-
cate that trapped particle populations are highly dynamic. Large solar events are
known to have created temporary proton belts and have enhanced the electron belts
[Gussenhoven 1991, Gussenhoven 1993, Dyer 1993]. These results indicate that the
static AP-8 and AE-8 models may significantly underestimate the concentration
of protons and electrons [Vette 1977, Abel 1994, Heynderickx 1996]. New, dynamic
models of the trapped particle radiation environment are being developed to describe
1.2. Radiation Environments and Anomalies 7
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the solar-modulated environment more accurately [Piet 2006, Brautigam 2004].
1.2.1.2 Galactic Cosmic Rays
Galactic cosmic rays (GCR) originate from sources outside our solar system and
are always present. In the absence of solar activity, cosmic radiation is composed
entirely of galactic radiation. GCRs are atomic nuclei from which all of the surround-
ing electrons have been stripped away during their high-speed passage through the
galaxy. Outside of our solar system, the spectrum of galactic cosmic rays is believed
to be uniform. Its composition as a function of atomic mass is given in Figure 1.7
[Sexton 1992, Meyer 1974]. It consists mostly of protons (Hydrogen nuclei) (85%)
and alpha particles (helium nuclei) (14%). Less than 1% of the galactic cosmic ray
spectrum is composed of high-energy heavy-ions.
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Figure 1.7: Flux of galactic cosmic ray particles for atomic masses up to 59
[Sexton 1992, Meyer 1974].
Figure 1.7 shows that the flux of protons is more than two orders of magnitude
higher than the flux of either carbon or oxygen. The energy spectrum of galactic cos-
mic rays is given in Figure 1.8 [Adams 1981]. Note that the x-axis unit of Figure 1.8
is MeV/nucleon, thus, for carbon with 12 nucleons, the point at 100MeV/nucleon
on the x-axis corresponds to an energy of 1.2GeV . For most ions, the flux peaks
between 100 and 1000MeV/nucleon. For carbon, the peak flux is at an energy of
approximately 2.4GeV . For protons and alpha particles, the energy of the ion can
be more than 100GeV/nucleon. At these high energies, it is nearly impossible to
shield electronic devices from cosmic rays.
1.2. Radiation Environments and Anomalies 9
210
110
010
-110
-210
-310
-410
-510
-610
-710
110 210 310 410 510 610
Particle Kinetic Energy [MeV/nucleon]
P
ro
to
n
s
H
e
F
e
C
 &
 O
F
lu
x
 
[p
a
rt
ic
le
s
/m
 -
s
te
r-
s
e
c
/M
e
V
/n
u
c
le
o
n
]
2
Figure 1.8: Energy spectrum of galactic cosmic rays [Adams 1981].
1.2.1.3 Solar Particle Events
The frequency and severity of solar particle events is naturally dependent on the
solar activity. Solar particle events (most commonly referred to as solar flares, but
also including larger events such as coronal mass ejections) are random in nature,
but follow the 11− year cycle of solar activity.
Figure 1.9 shows solar event proton fluences for solar cycles 20-22, superimposed
over a plot of the sunspot number [Barth 1997].
High-fluence proton events occur during solar active years, Interestingly, the
galactic cosmic ray flux is anti-correlated to the solar cycle, with maximum galactic
cosmic ray flux occurring during solar minimum conditions [Nuntiyakul 2014].
After a solar flare occurs, particles begin to arrive near the earth within tens
of minutes, peak in intensity within two hours to one day, and are gone within a
few days to one week (except for some solar flare particles which are trapped in the
earth’s radiation belts).
In a solar flare, energetic protons, alpha particles and heavy ions are emitted.
In most solar flares, the majority of emitted particles are protons (90-95%) and
alpha particles. Heavy ions constitute only a small fraction of the emitted particles,
and the number of heavy ions is normally insignificant compared to the background
concentration of heavy ions from galactic cosmic rays. In a large solar flare, the
number of protons and alpha particles can be greatly enhanced ( 104 times) over
the background galactic cosmic ray spectrum; whereas, the number of heavy ions
for a large solar flare approaches up to 50% of the background galactic cosmic
concentration of heavy ions [Adams 1981]. Associated with a solar flare is the solar
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Figure 1.9: Correlation of proton solar event fluence to sunspot number for solar
cycles 20-22. Sunspot number shown by the solid line plot [Barth 1997].
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wind or solar plasma. The solar wind usually arrives near the earth within one to two
days after a solar flare [Shea 1988]. As the solar wind strikes the magnetosphere, it
can cause disturbances in the geomagnetic fields (geomagnetic storm), compressing
them towards the earth. As a result, the solar wind can enhance the total dose
received by devices in low-earth orbits.
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Figure 1.10: Flux of cosmic ray particles at solar maximum, at solar minimum, and
for Adams’s [Adams 1982] 10% worst-case environment.
Figure 1.10 is a plot of the angular flux of cosmic ray particles (both solar and
galactic) during solar minimum and maximum inside a spacecraft in geosynchronous
orbit with 25 mils of aluminum shielding as a function of the Linear Energy Transfer
(LET)2 [Adams 1982].
1.2.2 Terrestrial Radiation Environment
When cosmic rays reach the earth’s atmosphere, they collide with atomic nuclei
in air and create cascades of interactions and reaction products (Leptons, Photons,
Hadrons), including neutrons, called air shower (Figure 1.12). Figure 1.11 shows
the energy required for protons (blue) and other ions (red) to penetrate the magne-
tosphere [Stassinopoulos 1988].
2The term linear energy transfer (LET) is frequently used to describe the energy loss per unit
path length of a particle as it passes through a material. LET has units of MeV · cm2/mg.
Because the energy loss per unit path length (in MeV/cm) is normalized by the density of the
target material (in mg/cm3), LET may be quoted roughly independent of the target. It can easily
relate the LET of a particle to its charge deposition per unit path length. In silicon, an LET of 97
MeV · cm2/mg corresponds to a charge deposition of 1 pC/µm.
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Figure 1.11: Total energy required to penetrate the magnetosphere
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The intensity of cosmic-ray-induced neutrons (and other secondary cosmic ra-
diation, including protons) in the atmosphere varies with altitude (Figure 1.13)
[O’Brien 1971, O’Brien 1978], location in the geomagnetic field and solar magnetic
activity. Atmospheric shielding at a given altitude is determined by the mass thick-
ness per unit area of the air above, called areal density or atmospheric depth.
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Figure 1.13: Particle Flux vs. Altitude at 54◦ Latitude [O’Brien 1971, O’Brien 1978]
The location and conditions for the reference cosmic-ray-induced terrestrial neu-
tron differential flux have been chosen to be New York City (Figure 1.12) out-
doors at sea level at a time of average solar activity. Per the JEDEC specification
[JESD89A 2006], the reference neutron flux in New York City is 13 neutrons/cm2/hour
[Gordon 2004].
1.2.2.1 Thermal Neutrons
Thermal Neutrons are neutrons that have lost kinetic energy until they reach a
state where they are in thermal equilibrium with their environment. Certain nuclear
fission reactions become much more probable with these low-energy neutrons and
result in reactions yielding charged particles.
The most common such reaction is with the 10 − B isotope of boron. Boron is
used as a p-type dopant and is also used as an implant in insulating layers formed
of Boron Doped Phosphosilicate Glass (BPSG). Thermal neutrons can interact with
these materials, and the charged particles generated from this reaction can induce
soft errors [Baumann 2005].
Recent work on thermal neutrons [Fang 2014, Wen 2010a, Wen 2010b] has shown
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that even when BPSG is not used in the fabrication process, devices can have a
sensitivity to thermal neutrons.
1.2.2.2 Muons
Atmospheric muons represent an important part of the natural radiation con-
straint at ground level. Muons belong to the Meson component in the atmospheric
cosmic ray cascades and are the products of the decay of charged pions via the
weak interaction. They constitute the most preponderant charged particles at sea
level [O’Brien 1971, O’Brien 1978]. Muons are charged particles; both negative and
positive muons can loss their kinetic energy by ionization process when they travel
through matter [Serre 2012]. But this interaction with matter is tenuous and muons
can travel large distances in matter, thus deeply penetrating into material circuits.
Ziegler and Lanford have been the first authors to point out precisely how muons
can interact with matter at relatively low incident primary energies [Ziegler 1979].
They decompose the interaction into three primary processes:
1. Muon direct ionization wake. A charged muon loses its kinetic energy passing
through semiconductor material by excitation of bound electrons and frees
electron-hole pairs along its path as a result.
2. Electromagnetic scattering which induces energetic coulomb silicon nucleus
recoil.
3. Capture of the negative muons by atomic nuclei when they are quasi stopped
in matter. This complex capture mechanism releases recoiling heavy nuclei
with a simultaneous emission of light particles (neutrons, protons, deuterons,
α particles, etc.).
Muons-induced SEEs were predicted in a number of early works on microelectronic
reliability: Wallmark and Marcus provided a brief investigation of the role of these
particles as one of the fundamental physical limits to continued microelectronic scal-
ing [Wallmark 1962]. Ziegler and Lanford provided a much expanded investigation
of cosmic ray induced error rates and predicted the coming of a dramatic increase
in errors with decreased critical charge [Ziegler 1979]. Recent Experimental results
[Sierawski 2010, Sierawski 2011] indicate technology scaling increases the sensitivity
of microelectronics to soft errors from low-energy muons.
1.2.2.3 Alpha Particles
Alpha particles are a type of ionizing radiation emitted through the decay of
unstable isotopes. They consist of two protons and two neutrons bound together
into a particle identical to a helium nucleus. In semiconductor devices, the main
source of alpha particles is from packaging materials. There are three radioactive
decay chains (Figure 1.14) that are primarily responsible for the α particles:
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1. The Thorium chain, which starts with Thorium-232 and finishes with Lead-
208.
2. The Uranium-238 chain, which starts with Uranium-238 and finishes with
Lead-206.
3. The Uranium-235 chain, which starts with Uranium-235 and finishes with
Lead-206.
Certain reactions along these decay chains result in the emission of an alpha particle
as shown by the red arrows in Figure 1.14.
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Figure 1.14: Thorium and Uranium Decay Chains.
Alpha-particles-induced soft errors are primarily of concern for Ball Grid Array
(BGA) packages, especially flip-chips. Figure 1.15 shows the cross section of a typical
flip-flip package. Any materials that are within 100µm of the die could potentially
emit alpha particles that affect the die. The energy of alpha particles is attenuated
as they traverse the Back End Of Line (BEOL) materials before they reach the
substrate (Figure 1.16).
Specifications of Materials Alpha Particle Emissivity There are no formal
definitions or standards (JEDEC, ISO, IEC, IEEE, etc.) for acceptable levels ma-
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Figure 1.15: Cross Section of Typical Flip-Chip Package.
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Figure 1.16: Cross-section schematic of a UBM and solder bump for a flip-chip
interconnect.
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terials alpha particle emissivity. The following two terms are commonly used in
industry [Wilkinson 2011]:
• Low Alpha (LA) - Low Alpha: emissivity 6 0.05 α/cm2/hour (sometime
expressed as 50 α · khr−1 · cm−2)
• Ultra Low Alpha (ULA) - Ultra Low Alpha: emissivity 6 0.002 α/cm2/hour
(sometime expressed as 2 α · khr−1 · cm−2)
1.3 Single Event Effects - Mechanism and Classification
Single Event Effects (SEEs) are induced by the interaction of an ionizing particle
with electronic components. Ionizing particles can be primary (such as heavy ions
in space environment or alpha particles produced by radioactive isotopes contained
in the die or its packaging), or secondary (recoils) created by the nuclear interaction
of a particle, like a neutron or a proton with silicon, oxygen or any other atom of
the die.
Energetic Particles can ionize (directly or indirectly) atoms, generating electron-
hole pairs. As long as the energies of the generated electrons and holes are higher
than the minimum energy required to create an electron-hole pair, these new elec-
trons and holes can generate additional electron-hole pairs (A single, high-energy
incident photon, electron, or proton can create thousands of electron-hole pairs).
This section describes the physical mechanisms that induce SEEs and to defines
and classify the different ways they alter circuit operation. First, a brief introduction
of nuclear physics, interaction mechanisms, and energy deposition, is given. Then,
the effects observed in electronic devices will be defined and classified.
1.3.1 Particles and Interactions
1.3.1.1 Gamma and X-Ray Ionization
Photons interact with material through three different processes, namely the
photoelectric (or fluorescent) effect, the compton effect, and pair production effect
[McLean 1987]. These processes are illustrated in Figure 1.17. For each of these
processes, the primary result of the interaction is the creation of energetic secondary
electrons.
Low-energy photons interact with material predominantly through the photo-
electric effect. The photoelectric effect is illustrated in Figure 1.17.a. The incident
photon excites an electron from an inner shell of the target atom to a high enough
state to be emitted free of the target atom. The incident photon is completely ab-
sorbed. Thus, the photoelectric effect creates a free electron (photoelectric electron)
and an ionized atom. In addition, as the photoelectric electron is emitted, an elec-
tron in an outer orbit of the atom will fall into the spot vacated by the photoelectron
causing a low-energy photon to be emitted.
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For higher-energy photons, Compton scattering is the most probable type of
interaction. Compton scattering is illustrated in Figure 1.17.b. The photon collides
with an atom and it transfers a fraction of its energy to an electron of the target
atom, giving the electron sufficient energy to be emitted free of the target atom. For
Compton scattering, a photon of lower energy is created which is free to interact
with other target atoms. It can also create a free electron and an ionized atom.
Pair production occurs only for very-high energy photons (E > 3MeV ). This
process is illustrated in Figure 1.17.c. The incident photon collides with a target
atom creating an electron-positron pair. A positron has the same properties as an
electron (charge and mass), except that the charge is positive. The incident photon
is completely annihilated in pair production.
Incoming
Photon
Photoelectric Photon
Compton Photon
Positron
Electron
Electron
Electron
Incoming
Photon
Incoming
Photon
A
B
C
Figure 1.17: Schematic drawing of three processes through which photons interact
with material: a) photoelectric effect, b) Compton scattering, and c) pair production
[McLean 1987].
1.3.1.2 Energetic Particle Ionization
There are two primary methods by which energetic particle radiation releases
charge in a semiconductor device: direct ionization by the incident particle itself, and
ionization by secondary particles created by nuclear reactions between the incident
particle and the struck device. Both mechanisms can lead to integrated circuit
malfunction.
Direct Ionization As an energetic particle passes through a material, it loses
energy by excitation and ionization of atoms, creating a very high density electron-
hole plasma along the path of the particle. The amount of energy that a particle
deposits per unit depth in a material is given by its stopping power. The mass-
stopping power is defined as the linear energy transfer, LET.
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The integral of LET over path length gives the total deposited energy. Figure
1.19 [Sexton 1992] is a plot of stopping power (LET) for 2.5MeV alpha particle as
a function of depth in silicon. The point of maximum stopping power is called the
Bragg peak. The LET for a given particle depends on the target material and the
particle’s energy.
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Figure 1.20: Schematic diagram and time dependence for charge collection by drift,
funneling, and diffusion [Schwank 2008].
If an energetic particle passes through a p− n junction, charge can be collected
at the electrodes by drift of carriers from the depletion region. The drift of carriers
to the electrodes occurs within hundreds of picoseconds after a particle strike. This
is represented as QD in Figure 1.20 [Schwank 2008].
The amount of charge that is collected by drift of carriers within the depletion
region can be greatly enhanced by field funneling [Hsieh 1981] (QF in Figure 1.20).
The density of the electron-hole created by the ion strike is considerably greater
than the doping concentration of typical p-n junctions [McLean 1982]. The high
concentrations of electron and holes in the plasma will distort the original depletion
region of the junction along the path of the ion. As a consequence, the junction
field region creates a funnel region that extends down into the substrate as depicted
in Figure 1.20.
The funnel will exist as long as the concentration of electron-hole pairs in the
plasma created by the ion strike is large compared to the doping concentration of
the substrate. Diffusion of carriers to the edge of the junction depletion or funnel
region contributes a another component to the collected charge. The diffusion of
carriers takes much longer (nanoseconds to microseconds) than the drift component.
The diffusion of carriers is noted as QDF in Figure 1.20.
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Indirect Ionization Light particles (neutron and protons) usually [Weulersse 2011]
do not produce enough charge to cause SEEs by direct ionization. However, protons
and neutrons can both produce significant SEE rates due to indirect mechanisms.
As a high-energy proton or neutron enters the semiconductor lattice it may undergo
a nuclear interaction with a target nucleus. Any one of several nuclear reactions
may occur, including:
1. Elastic Interaction
2. Inelastic Interaction
3. Inelastic Collision
4. Nuclear Fission
Elastic Interaction In the elastic process (Figure 1.21), the recoil nucleus is
identical to the target nucleus. In the collision, the total kinetic energy and the
momentum of the neutron-target nucleus system are conserved. A fraction of the
energy of the neutron is given to the nucleus [Nicolaidis 2011, Chapter 2].
NEUTRON
SILICON
SILICON
NEUTRON
Figure 1.21: Elastic Interaction
Inelastic Interaction Nonelastic interactions (spallation) group all the inter-
actions that result in a fragmentation of the nucleus in two or more recoil fragments.
Generally, the lighter recoil is indicated to describe the reaction: (n, p), (n, α), (n, d).
The heavier element is obtained by the equilibrium of the number of neutrons and
protons before and after the reaction. With 28Si as the target nucleus, (n, p) reac-
tion results in a proton and Al recoil while (n, α) reaction results in He and Mg
recoils (Figure 1.22) [Nicolaidis 2011, Chapter 2].
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Figure 1.22: Inelastic Interaction
Inelastic Collision - (n, n0) In this reaction, the incident neutron is absorbed
in the target nucleus and a short time later a neutron is ejected with a lower energy,
sharing a part of the total kinetic energy with the recoil target nucleus (Figure 1.23)
[Nicolaidis 2011, Chapter 2].
NEUTRON
SILICON (28) SILICON (29)
NEUTRON
SILICON (28)
Figure 1.23: Inelastic Collision
Fission Two isotopes of boron exist, 10B (19.1% abundance) and 11B (80.1%
abundance). Different from other isotopes 10B is highly unstable when exposed
to neutrons. Furthermore, while other isotopes emit only gamma photons after
absorbing a neutron, the 10B nucleus fissions, producing an excited 7Li recoil nucleus
and an alpha particle (Figure 1.24). Although neutrons with any energy can induce
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fission, the probability decreases rapidly with increasing neutron energy. Therefore,
only thermal neutrons need to be considered [Nicolaidis 2011, Chapter 1].
THERMAL
NEUTRON
BORON (10)
LITHIUM
GAMMA
HELIUM (Alpha Particle)
Figure 1.24: Nuclear Fission
1.3.1.3 Cumulative Radiation Effects
Electronics used in space or highly radioactive environments may be degraded
due to the cumulative effect of exposure to radiation.
Total Ionizing Dose Total Ionizing Dose (TID) effect results from charge be-
ing trapped in the oxide layer and causing a change in the characteristics of the
transistor. Cumulative long term ionizing damage due to protons and electrons
can cause devices to suffer threshold voltage shifts, increased device leakage (power
consumption), timing changes, decreased functionality, etc.
Displacement Effects Highly energized particles may displace atoms in the sili-
con lattice (Figure 1.25) of active devices and thereby affect their function. Bipolar
devices and especially optical devices may be very sensitive to this effect. Comple-
mentary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) integrated circuits are normally not
considered to suffer degradation by displacement damage.
1.3.2 Single Event Effects Classification
SEE is general term that groups all the possible effects induced by the interaction
of an ionizing particle with electronic components. These effects are classified in hard
errors and soft errors: Hard errors are non-recoverable errors. Soft errors may be
recovered by a reset, a power cycle or simply a rewrite of the information. The
following sections presents
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Figure 1.25: Displacement Effect
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Figure 1.26: Single Event Transient production: interaction of an ionizing particle
with an inverter.
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1.3.2.1 Soft Errors
Single Event Transient Single Event Transients (SET) are momentary volt-
age or current disturbances affecting combinational gates. In the case where a
single particle strike (the particle itself or its recoils) would affect two or more
combinational gates, the SEE is called Single Event Multiple Transient (SEMT)
[Harada 2011, Rossi 2005]. Although an SET does cause a transient in the gate
output struck by the recoil ion, it may propagate through subsequent gates and
eventually cause an Soft Error when it reaches a memory element (Figure 1.27
[Gadlage 2009]).
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Figure 1.27: Single Event Transient: generation and propagation [Gadlage 2009].
Single Event Upset A Single Event Upset SEU occurs when an ionizing particle
strike modifies the electrical state of a storage cell, such that an error is produced
when the cell is read. In an Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) or a flip-
flop, the state of the memory is reversed. In a Dynamic Random Access Memory
(DRAM), the charge stored can be slightly modified and interpreted as a wrong
value by the read circuitry. In the case where a single particle strike (the particle
itself or its recoils) would affect two or more combinational gates, the SEE is Single
Event Multiple Upset (SEMU) [Dodd 2003].
Single Bit Upset, Multi Cell Upset, Multi Bit Upset - SBU, MCU, MBU
Single Bit Upsets(SBUs) are events, equivalent to SEUs, induced in a memory by
SEEs. The interaction of an ionizing particle with the memory is obviously depen-
dent on the type of the memory. As an example, the production mechanism of
the SBU in an SRAM device is similar to the SEU mechanism described earlier for
sequential cells (Figure 1.28).
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Figure 1.28: Single Event Upset mechanism.
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In the case where a single particle strike (the particle itself or its recoils) would
affect two or more memory cells, the SEE is called Multiple Cell Upset (MCU). If
the physically neighborhood cells affected by particle interaction belong to the same
logical word, then an Multiple Bit Upset (MBU) is produced.
The MCU/MBU analysis is particularly interesting when considering the even-
tual error protection mechanisms. SBUs are corrected by the most common error-
mitigation techniques - the Single Error Correct, Double Error Detect (SECDED)
codes, such as the Hamming code. Thus, the SBUs in SECDED protected memo-
ries will not need particular care. However, the MBUs will not be corrected by this
code, causing further errors in the circuit. The MBU probability can be considerably
reduced by implementing column multiplexing.
Single Event Functional Interrupt - SEFI Single Event Functional Interrupt
(SEFI) is a broad term that refers to an anomalous behavior observed in complex
devices (flash memories, DRAM, SRAM, Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA),
microprocessors, micro-controllers, etc.). It can be the result of the upset of some
registers or latches that are used in the configuration of the working modes of these
complex devices. he effect of a SEFI is detectable and it does not result in permanent
damage. A SEFI can be recovered by resetting or power-cycling the device.
Single Event Latchup - SEL A Single Event Latchup (SEL) is a potentially
catastrophic condition where a low resistance path develops between power supply
and ground [Sexton 2003] on a device that remains after the triggering event is
removed. When currents are sufficiently high metal traces can vaporize, bond wires
can fuse open, and silicon regions can be melted due to thermal runaway. Once
latched, this high current condition will continue until power is removed from the
device or it fails catastrophically. Figure 1.29 shows the parasitic structure leading
to latchup on the cross-section of a Bulk CMOS technology. Figure 1.30 shows the
I − V characteristic of a latchup.
1.3.2.2 Hard Errors
Single Event Burnout - SEB A Single Event Burnout (SEB) occurs when the
passage of an energetic particle heavy ion causes a power Field Effect Transistor
(FET) to enter second breakdown [Sexton 2003]. If not rapidly quenched, the resul-
tant high current causes the device to go into thermal runaway resulting in destruc-
tive failure. Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR) is often observed simultaneously
with SEB in power Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistors(MOSFETs).
Figure 1.31 shows the parasitic structure responsible of SEB on the cross-section of
a vertical power MOSFET.
Single Event Gate Rupture - SEGR Single-Event Gate-Rupture (SEGR) is
a condition where the gate dielectric isolating the gate and channel regions fails
[Sexton 2003]. The SEGR process [Sexton 2003] is initiated when a heavy ion strikes
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Figure 1.29: Structure Leading to Latchup Highlighted on the Cross-Section of a
Bulk CMOS Technology (n-substrate material).
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Figure 1.31: Structure responsible of SEB Highlighted on the Cross-Section of a
Vertical Power MOSFET
the device in the neck region (the neck region is the area between the p-body dif-
fusions at the surface). The ion strike creates a filament of electron-hole pairs. For
an n-channel power MOSFET, the generated holes drift toward the interface and
the electrons toward the drain contact due to the electric field resulting from the
positive drain bias. Upon reaching the interface, the holes start to pile up at the
interface and leak off, only slowly, toward the source contact. This pool of positive
charge increases the electric field in the oxide, and when the field exceeds a criti-
cal value, oxide breakdown occurs. The collected holes then discharge through the
oxide, heating the structure locally. If the breakdown current lasts long enough, it
creates a permanent short-circuit through the oxide. Figure 1.32 shows the SEGR
mechanism.
Single Event induced Snap Back - SESB A Single Event induced Snap Back
(SESB), is a stable regenerative condition similar to latchup, caused by drain-
to-source breakdown in normal n-Metal Oxide Semiconductor (MOS) transistors
[Sexton 2003]. Like latchup, a high current condition results that can cause per-
manent damage to a device. Unlike latchup, a p-n-p-n four layer structure is not
necessary for snap back. For this reason, it is often referred to as transistor latchup.
All device types have the epitaxial n-layer on the highly doped n+ material.
Since the off-state N-MOS transistors are responsible for the snapback in a CMOS
circuit, we expect a well developed depletion region around the drain as shown in
1.33.a . Soon after the passage of an ion through the depletion region, the electron-
hole pairs commence movement along the field lines. Most electrons travel toward
the drain, whereas the holes move mainly toward the source (Figure 1.33.b ). Some
holes, however, travel through the p-regions toward the ground plane. At this
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Figure 1.32: SEGR Mechanism [Sexton 2003]
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Figure 1.33: SESB Mechanism [Ochoa 1983]
1.3. Single Event Effects - Mechanism and Classification 33
stage the parasitic bipolar transistor can be turned on as shown in 1.33.c . Once
the parasitic transistor is turned on and the regenerative breakdown condition has
occurred, the transistor can be shut off only when the current between the drain
and the source is reduced below the cut-off (sustaining) current level. The effect
of funneling may accelerate the onset of the snapback. The introduction of the
p-well feature slightly complicates the picture since additional parasitic (vertical)
bipolar transistors become active. Nevertheless, the basic model describes the main
snapback mechanism, i.e., a low resistance path is formed between the source and
the drain of the off-state-N-MOSMOS transistor [Ochoa 1983].
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2.1 Introduction
Hardware is intrinsically unreliable. External and internal perturbations can
cause data corruption, faulty states and unpredictable circuit behavior. Single
Events Effects (SEEs) represent a particularly representative example of such is-
sues. SEEs are caused by energetic particles from the environment (neutrons, pro-
tons, heavy ions, muons, ...) or from the device’s own materials (alpha particles
emitted by radioactive contaminants).
Hardware (Low-level) faults represents the direct outcome of a Single Event
on the output of the affected cell: Single Event Transients in combinational cells
and Single Event Upsets in sequential cells. These faults must propagate in the
logic network up to the input of a memorization element: a memory block or a
sequential cell. Then, If the event is latched in the memorization element, the
fault becomes a Soft Error. If the Soft Error causes an observable modification
of the expected systems’ behavior, then the Functional Failure is a usable concept
for this occurrence. Analyzing the effect of faults induced by Soft Error (SE) in
complex integrated circuits remains challenging. The vast majority of faults do
not propagate due to the various de-rating (or masking effects): Electrical De-
Rating (EDR), Logical De-Rating (LDR), TDR, Memory De-Rating (MDR) and
36 Chapter 2. Single Event Effect Analysis
Functional De-Rating (FDR). In the following sections, these de-rating (or masking)
mechanisms are described.
In the following section will present the three main step of an Soft Error Rate
(SER) analysis methodology: the technology SER characterization of standard cells
and memory blocks, the various de-rating factors and finally the overall SER cal-
culation. The SER methodology presented focuses on non-destructive SEEs: Bit
Upsets in memory blocks and sequential cells, Transients in combinational cells.
2.2 Technology SER Characterization
The technology SER characterization is the first step of the presented SER
methodology. Raw SER data should be provided in terms of raw (intrinsic) rate/prob-
ability of occurrence of logic SEU or SET for combinational, sequential and memory
cells for a specific environment.
The final operating environment should be also carefully analyzed, of a particular
interest to most commercial and aeronautical applications is the natural background,
terrestrial environment characterized by a natural contribution of atmospheric neu-
trons and internal alpha particles from contaminants. The neutron SER is specific
to the technology and the environment (altitude and localization). The alpha con-
tribution depends strongly on the sensitivity of the cell to alpha particles and the
alpha emissivity rate of the packaging materials.
2.2.1 Memory Intrinsic SER Characterization
SRAM memory blocks are prime targets for any reliability-related initiatives.
Their high integration levels, reduced features size and small critical charge make
them sensitive to Single Event Effects. Thus, the first task consists in characterizing
the SEE performances of the memory instances with regard to Single Event Upsets
affecting data stored in the memorization cells but also Single Event Effects on
addressing/decoding/control logic. This analysis should concern both qualitative
(type, manifestation and outcome of the events) and quantitative aspects (event
rate/type for a given working environment).
The set of memory characterization data is comprised of: Single Bit Upset (SBU)
rates and Multiple Cell Upset (MCU) rates for each possible pattern and Multiple
Bit Upsets (MBU) rates for different column multiplexing configurations.
2.2.2 Standard Cell Intrinsic SER Characterization
SEUs - Single Event Upsets affecting the sequential cells of the design have an
obvious impact on the circuit reliability. Single Event Transients - SETs affecting
combinational cells are much more difficult to characterize: the transient pulses at
the output of the cell have various shapes, amplitudes and durations. Moreover,
the SET parameters strongly depend on the state and the neighborhood of the
cell. Lastly, the standard cell library may contain an order of magnitude more
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combinational cells with various functions and drive strengths than sequential cells,
requiring an adequate characterization effort through radiation testing or simulation.
Moreover, the actual cell behavior also depends on the circuit implementation and
the usage of the cells for a given workload. The fan-out of a combinational cell
will have a strong impact on SET characteristics. The signal values on the inputs
of the cells will determine the sensitive transistors and implicitly the occurrence
probability of the SEE
Standard cell SER characterization data should be provided in terms of raw
(intrinsic) rate/probability of occurrence of logic SEU or SET for combinational
and sequential cells for a given environment. Pulse width distributions of logic,
rectangular SETs should be also provided.
2.3 Masking Effects
Not all radiation induced faults propagate and produce errors because of the
numerous masking effects. The raw rate of faults can be de-rated to obtain an
effective error rate using a de-rating factor. In this work, a de-rating factor of
1 indicates that all faults propagate and a value of 0 indicates that all faults are
blocked. The definitions are important as some authors use the term masking factor
to indicate the fraction of faults that are masked, which is the opposite of a de-rating
factor.
2.3.1 Electrical De-Rating
The Electrical De-Rating (EDR) quantifies the electrical attenuation of an SET
and thus its capability to propagate through the logic network.
One aspect of electrical de-rating is accounted for by considering how the induced
analog pulse is mapped to a digital pulse. The shape of a radiation induced pulse is
shown in Figure 2.1 and based on the logic threshold voltage, it can be modeled as
a digital pulse of width Pulse Width (PW). Pulses whose amplitude never reaches
Vth are masked [Hane 2008, Tanaka 2009]. A further aspect of EDR relates to the
fact that when the pulse duration is short (comparable to the gate rise/fall times),
it may be attenuated as it passes through downstream gates.
2.3.2 Logic De-Rating
Logic De-Rating (LDR) consists in evaluating the propagation of the logic fault
from the output of the affected cell to the inputs of a sequential/memory cell. Ac-
cording to the state of the circuit (the values of the signals and cell outputs), the
propagation of the fault is subject to logic blocking [Vilchis 2012], [Nicolaidis 2011,
Chapter 5]. Figure 2.2 presents the concept of Logic De-Rating for SEUs: within
the clock cycle when it occurs (figure 2.2.a) and over several clock cycles (figure
2.2.b). And for SET (figure 2.2.c).
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Figure 2.2: Logic De-Rating of SEUs and SETs
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2.3.3 Temporal De-Rating
Temporal de-rating (TDR1) relates to the opportunity window of a fault (SET
or SEU) to be latched in a down-stream memorizing element (Flip-Flop, Latch,
Memory). If the fault is not stored in a register or a memory cell, there is no impact
in the functioning of the circuit (the fault is dropped). The memorization of the
fault depends on its type:
SEU Temporal De-Rating SEUs must arrive in the affected register early in
the clock period in order to propagate through the logic network and reach the next
sequential stage. Figure 2.3 shows the cases of masked and unmasked SEUs.
An SEU affecting a sequential cell, unless logically-masked, will propagate through
the downstream logic combinational network and reach the next sequential logic
stage. The SEU will remain on the flip-flop outputs until the next latching (clock)
cycle.
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Figure 2.3: SEU Temporal derating
Since the SEU arrival is a random phenomenon (likewise to the SET) the SEU
Temporal De-Rating is defined as the ratio between the opportunity window and
the clock period; the opportunity window depends on the paths’ delay and on the
setup/hold times of the downstream flip-flop. The TDR is given by equation 2.1
[Nicolaidis 2011, Chapter 5].
SEU Temporal De-Rating =
tslack +
tsetup
2 −
thold
2
Tclock
(2.1)
1In some works[Seifert 2004, Ghahroodi 2011, Bramnik 2013, Nguyen 2005] the term Temporal
Vulnerability Factor (TVF) is used instead of TDR
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If the downstream paths are relaxed (high slack), the opportunity window for
a SEU is quite large. If the flip-flop belongs to the critical path or similarly-timed
paths, the slack is very low and thus the opportunity window is reduced, with a
sharp decrease in the TDR values. Intuitively, it is clear that the same circuit will
exhibit worse sequential SER values at lower clock frequencies.
SET Temporal De-Rating SETs must cause an incorrect value on the input of
a memorizing element during the latching window. Figure 2.4 shows the cases of
masked (figure 2.4(a)) and unmasked (figure 2.4(a)) SET. Single Event Transients
manifest as short pulses on the output of the affected cell. SETs are possible in
the case of combinational cells but also in the case of sequential elements such as
flip-flop and latches when the Single Event only affects the output stages but not
the inner memorization loop [Alexandrescu 2013].
Z
CLK
Tcycle
(a) SET is Masked
Z
CLK
Tcycle
(b) SET is Latched
Figure 2.4: SET Temporal De-Rating
An SET, unless logically-masked, will propagate through the downstream logic
combinational network and reach the next sequential logic stage. The TDR rep-
resents probability of the SET to be memorized. Since the SET is a random phe-
nomenon, the TDR depends on to the pulse width (PW) and the clock period. To a
first approximation, the TDR is proportional to the ratio of the induced pulse width
to the clock period as shown in equation 2.2, where pi is the probability of having
a transient with PW = i.
TDRSET =
PmaxPW
i=minPW pi · i
Tclk
(2.2)
For recent technology nodes, most of the combinational cells exhibit pulse du-
ration of tens/hundreds picoseconds [Evans 2013b, Costenaro 2013a], which is still
low with regard to nanosecond-clock period. Thus the temporal de-rating is strong
for the SETs and will reduce their relative criticality. However, extensive test results
have shown that at higher frequencies, the TDR factor increases and the effect of
SETs is more severe [Mahatme 2011, Nguyen 2005, Gill 2009].
In figure 2.5 the possible alignments of a pulse compared to the sampling clock
edge are shown, both for the case when the pulse is longer and shorter than the
setup-hold window. For the cases of PW > tsetup + thold,the Overlapping Width,
OW , is defined to be the extent of the pulse that lies within the setup-hold window.
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The error capture probability is taken to be proportional to the ratio of OW to the
full setup-hold window: OW
thold+tsetup
.
For the cases of PW < tsetup + thold, the two violation cases are considered
together, and the error latching probability is taken to be linear with the overlapping
width ratio as before. A SET can occur at any time in the clock period with a
uniform probability. In both cases above, averaged over the full clock period, the
overall error latching probability is PW
Tclk
. The calulated error probablity for each
case is shown in table 4.5
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Figure 2.5: SET Pulse Alignment Cases[Evans 2013a, Costenaro 2013b]
It is important to note that in this analysis, the pulse width of interest is that at
the input to the sampling flip-flop. The shape of a radiation induced pulse may be
distorted as it propagates through a combinatorial network. This effect is referred
to as Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening (PIPB) (Figure 2.6) and has been
extensively studied in [Cavrois 2008, Sterpone 2011, Ferlet-Cavrois 2010].
2.3.4 Functional De-Rating
Functional De-rating (FDR) [Silburt 2009], [Nicolaidis 2011, Chapter 5] eval-
uates whether the Soft Error has any observable impact (failure classes) on the
functioning of the circuit, board or system. It takes in account the actual usage of
the circuit and the function of the system.
The observability criteria could involve both objective and subjective aspects to
discriminate between the fault-free and faulty states of the system. An objective
example of the discrimination criteria could be the comparison of the primary out-
puts of the circuit under test to the reference, fault-free ones. Any difference could
be legitimately classified as a failure. However, a subjective observer may add his
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Table 2.1: SET Pulse Alignment and Capture Probabilities [Evans 2013a,
Costenaro 2013b]
Pulse Width Case Case Error Prob. Comments
PW > tsetup + thold
a 0.0 Correct value latched
b 1
Tclk
·
R tsetup
0
OW
thold+tsetup
dOW Set-up time violation
c 1
Tclk
·
R tsetup+thold
tsetup
OW
thold+tsetup
dOW Hold time violation
d PW−tsetup−thold
Tclk
Wrong value latched
e 1
Tclk
·
R tsetup+thold
thold
OW
thold+tsetup
dOW Set-up time violation
f 1
Tclk
·
R thold
0
OW
thold+tsetup
dOW Hold time violation
g 0.0 Correct value latched
PW < tsetup + thold
h 0.0 Correct value latched
i 1
Tclk
·
R tsetup
0
OW
thold+tsetup
dOW Set-up time violation
j PW ·(thold+tsetup−PW )
Tclk·(thold+tsetup)
Metastability
k 1
Tclk
·
R thold
0
OW
thold+tsetup
dOW Hold time violation
l 0.0 Correct value latched
Overall - PW
Tclk
-
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Figure 2.6: Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening - PIPB
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own weight/criticality to the observed difference. The recorded primary output dif-
ference may not be relevant for specific cases or applications, removing the observed
failure.
The failure classification implies some degree of subjectivity, since a criticality
parameter can be also added to the fault classes. Furthermore, the usage of the
circuit will have a strong impact on the failure analysis, since different function
modes/applications will exhibit different SE-related failures. If the circuit under
test has a clearly-stated function, then the functional de-rating will have to consider
this specific functions and the effect of relevant parameters. However, for general-
purpose circuits such as CPUs, the possible application field is quite large, thus
rendering the FDR analysis much more complex.
As stated, the FDR computation takes in account the propagation of the Soft
Error during several clock cycles. The implied goal is to evaluate whether the SE
• has been silently discarded (dropped), without any further impact on the
functioning of the circuit
• remains in the circuit in a latent state without any observable degradation of
the function or structure of the circuit
• produces a functional failure.
Differently from the other derating factors, the FDR is not a single number but, for
a given application, there will be as many FDRs as the number of failure classes
considered.
2.3.5 Memory De-Rating
The Memory De-Rating [Alexandrescu 2011] represents the portion of time dur-
ing which the data stored in a memory will eventually be read and thus used by
the application. This metric is called vulnerability window and it corresponds to
the time between a write access to an address and the last read access to that ad-
dress before the end of the simulation or before another write access to that address
(Figure 2.7). Oppositely, during the time between the last read access and a write
access, the data is still in the memory but will not be used by the circuit. If an
upset occurs during this time, it will have no effect because the corrupted data will
never be read and will be overwritten by the write access. Figure 2.7 shows a series
of read and write accesses to a memory address; the corresponding memory derating
is given by equation 2.3.
Memory De-Rating =
(t2 − t0) + (t4 − t3) + (t7 − t6)
Te − Ts
(2.3)
2.4 Overall SER Computation
The overall SER analysis combines the data obtained from the technology SER
characterization with the de-rating information to provide an application and environment-
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Figure 2.7: Sequence of memory accesses
dependent SER figures for the considered design.
For a given application and considering a specific failure class j, the failure rate
for a chip can be calculated with the following equations:
SERchip,j = SERsequential,j + SERcomb,j + SERmemory,j + SERclock,j (2.4)
The contribution, to the overall failure rate, of the sequential portion of the
circuit can be calculated with the following equations:
SERsequential,j =
X
i2F lipF lop
SEU -FITi · LDRi · TDRi · FDRi,j (2.5)
SERcomb,j =
X
i2Gate
FDRi,j ·LDRi,j ·
Z w=max
w=min
SET -FITi(w)·TDRi(w)·EDRi(w)dw
(2.6)
SERmemory,j =
X
i2Memory
FIT (i) ·MDRi,j (2.7)
where:
• j represents a class of failure (all equations)
• SEU -FITi represents the intrinsic rate of occurrence of SEUs for the sequen-
tial instance instance i (equation 2.5)
• w represents the pulse width(equation 2.6)
• SET -FITi(w) represents the intrinsic rate of occurrence of SETs for the com-
binational instance instance i (equation 2.6)
• FIT (i) represents the uncorrectable error rate for the memory instance i
(equation 2.7)
A high-level view of the SER analysis from faults to system level failures is shown
in figure 2.8 [Evans 2014]. On the left are the faults that can be induced in flip-flops,
logic gates and memories. In the middle the de-rating effects and on the right the
failure rate per each failure class.
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Figure 2.8: Soft Error Effect Analysis [Evans 2014]
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3.1 Introduction
The continuing evolution of the technology allows building increasingly complex
electronic devices integrating more and more functions. This evolution is not free
of problems, or more appropriate, challenges to overcome. An increasing source of
problems concerning the reliability of new technological processes is the perturbation
induced by energetic particles (the SEEs). First applications to incite some inter-
est with respect to SEEs were obviously limited to specific applications: aero-space
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[Binder 1975], high-reliability, nuclear facilities equipment, implantable medical de-
vices [Bradley 1998]. However, technological advances make possible the continuous
diminution of the transistor size, rendering the components more sensitive to pertur-
bations induced by radiation. Thus, is no longer possible to ignore Single Events for
future and present technologies working in a natural environment [Normand 1996].
Memory devices are invariably amongst the first circuits to be implemented
in a new process. Their highly regular structure makes them perfect candidates
and a highly effective benchmark and test vehicle for estimating performance and
reliability metrics, including the SER [Cannon 2004]. In contrast, logic networks
have a much more complex internal structure that allows the SEEs to manifest in
very diverse ways with varying levels of criticality. Evaluating the sensitivity of
the circuit with respect to SEEs in a neutron environment is not any easy task.
Intrinsic (raw) cell sensitivity figures must be provided as a starting point. This
is challenge by itself [Vial 1998, Tosaka 1999]. The SEUs - Single Event Upsets
affecting the sequential cells of the design have an obvious impact on the circuit
reliability. Single Event Transients affecting combinational cells are much more
difficult to characterize: the transient pulses at the output of the cell have various
shapes, amplitudes and duration. Moreover, the SET parameters strongly depend
on the state and the neighborhood of the cell. Lastly, the standard cell library may
contain an order of magnitude more combinational cells with various functions and
drive strengths than sequential cells, requiring an adequate characterization effort
through radiation testing or simulation.
The research community offers a wealth of solutions for each step of the design
flow, for any practical representation of the circuit, with a large specter of perfor-
mance and facility of use. Obviously, the prime targets of the SER characterization
and improvement efforts are the memory and sequential cells. In previous techno-
logical processes, the combinational cells have a limited (arguably) criticality, due
to the lower intrinsic sensibility (than same-process sequential cells) and a stronger
electrical and timing de-rating for SET events. However, the SETs are considered
[Sanda 2005] to become a critical contributor to the overall circuit SER, consider-
ably justifying the marked increase in the interest that both the academy and the
industry show to these events. We present in this paper the results of a practi-
cal, candid approach to a possible exhaustive SET evaluation flow in an industrial
setting. The main steps of this process consists in:
• Fully characterize the standard cell library using a process and library-aware
SER tool.
• Evaluate SET effects in the logic networks of the circuit using a variety dy-
namic (simulation-based) and static (probabilistic) methods.
• Compute overall SET figures.
The considered library is the Nangate 45nm Open Cell Library [Nangate 2008],
characterized using a 45nm generic SER process database. A purely-combinational
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32-bit floating point multiplier from OpenCores [Opencores 2013] has been imple-
mented using the library. The resulting gate-level netlist and accompanying Stan-
dard Delay Format (SDF) file have been simulated using event-driven simulator
tools using a reference serial fault simulation approach, an accelerated fault simula-
tion method and a static, probabilistic algorithm. The objectives of this approach
are the following: investigate the feasibility of adding SET analysis capability to
a standard design flow, benchmark the different approaches in terms of quality of
results, implementation and simulation efforts (both human and CPU), and provide
guidance to designers.
The result of these efforts show that characterizing the full standard cell library
is a perfectly approachable task providing easy-to-use and reusable results; that the
SET analysis can be performed with various degrees of accuracy (and corresponding
effort) and that worst-case, pessimistic results can be obtained with a good accuracy
and a reasonable investment of time, allowing the designers to optimize their efforts
in allotting the right amount of time for a problem of medium criticality. In addition,
an upgrade path for further technology nodes is clearly possible with a maximum
reuse of tools and methodologies.
3.2 SET Characterization of the Standard Cell Library
The radiation testing of combinational cells has the specific advantage of mea-
suring the cells sensitivity in the intended working environment. To accomplish
this task, dedicated test vehicles have to be designed [Perez 2006, Nicolaidis 2003,
Eaton 2004]. These sensors provide an accurate measure of the SET rates but also
allow the measuring of the pulse width of the observed events. Another approach to
the combinational cell SER study consists in using software tools, standard (full 3D-
Technology CAD (TCAD) tools, SPICE simulators using SET double-exponential
and or Qcrit models) or dedicated, such as those that mentioned in the following.
• A first class of tools that can be used to study radiation-induced single event
transient, consists in the nuclear physics software tools: HETC [Townsend 2005];
GNASH [Young 1977]; MCNP [Forster 2004]; MC-RED [Wrobel 2001]; Geant4
[Agostinelli 2003]. These tools are quite complex and may require multiple
physics and semiconductor competencies.
• A second class of tools (using statistical methods) has been also proposed: the
BGR method [Letaw 1991] and the DASIE [Hubert 2001] tool allowing the
cell designers to approach the SEE phenomena with a good degree of comfort.
• A third class of prediction tools, using Monte-Carlo techniques [Reed 2013]
are able to accurately take in account the geometry/topology of the device:
the MC-ORACLE [Wrobel 2011]; the MUSCA SEP3 platform [Hubert 2009];
the SEMM [Murley 1996] and SEMM-2 [Tang 2008] tools.
Recently, dedicated tools such as the TFIT tool [Hane 2008, Belhaddad 2006,
Belhaddad 2008] have been specifically developed to predict and improve the cell
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SER performance. This generation of tools allows reasonably accurate calculation
of the electrical effect of particles impact to a transistor, a cell, or a circuit early
in the design flow, at much faster speeds than traditional 3D-TCAD simulations
(whereas the 3D-TCAD approach does not apply in the case of neutrons impact and
circuits analysis). The tool is able to provide SER data for a variety of operating
environment characterized by the type of particles.
N+ P+
N-Well
P-Substrate
P+N+
VDD
Figure 3.1: Single Event Transient - Production and Modeling: Interaction of a
charged particle with the transistor
V pulse (V)
Vdd
Vtr
Vgnd
Delta t (ns)
Figure 3.2: Single Event Transient - Production and Modeling: SET: Analog tran-
sient and logic model
The SET is direct consequence of a SEE. The production mechanism (Figure
3.1) and its manifestation at the output of the affected cell (Figure 3.2) have been
presented in literature [Dodd 2004, Hass 1999b, Gadlage 2004]. We use a transient
logic fault model with an occurrence probability - the SET SER. One Failure In
Time (FIT) is one SET during a billion working hours for a MegaCell which is 220
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(1048576) identical cells. Several factors (external and internal) may have an impact
on the SET characteristics and propagation:
• The state of the cell.
• The supply voltage.
• The capacitive load on the charge collection.
• Threshold voltages of the downstream cell.
We only consider transient pulses that have sufficient voltage amplitude to switch
the transistors from the following, fan-out cell (VSET > VTHRESHOLD) and with a
transient pulse duration (PW) large enough to be able to propagate at least through
a few levels of combinational cells. We have selected a practical value of 25ps.
3.2.1 TFIT Overview
TFIT [Hane 2008, Belhaddad 2006, Belhaddad 2008] is a fast simulation tool
that is used to predict and improve the SER and the FIT performance of cells
design before production. TFIT allows accurate calculation of the electrical effect
of particles impact to a transistor, a cell, or a circuit early in the design flow, at
much faster speeds than traditional 3D-TCAD simulations (whereas the 3D-TCAD)
approach does not apply in the case of neutrons impact and circuits analysis). TFIT
interfaces with Spice simulators so the electrical impact of the particle on a transistor
is analyzed on a whole cell or circuit. Particles can be either neutrons (cosmic rays),
alpha particles or heavy ions. Figure 3.3 shows the main modules of TFIT.
TFIT reads the input design in Spice netlist format and calculates the single
event effects, the cross sections or the FIT values according to the options provided
in a configuration file. For each transistor specified in the input, TFIT extracts
a networking environment and then characterizes these environments by means of
spice simulation. This characterization along with the process technology and the
electrical data in the spice netlist are used to generate the current pulses representing
particles impact induced currents.
3.2.1.1 Technology Response Model
For every given process node, the response of both OFF N and P MOS transistor
struck by ionizing particles are computed using 3D-TCAD simulation. The LET,
impact point and angle of ionizing particles, as well as the electrical environment
of the device are taken into account (Supply Voltage applied to the device). An
appropriate Design of Experiment (DoE) is run to allow building the TFIT Techno-
logical Response Model that consists in a collection of current pulses, corresponding
to the various cases presented above. These two sets of curves (corresponding to
OFF-NMOS and OFF-PMOS transistors) are stored in two databases that are then
used during the TFIT simulation.
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Figure 3.3: TFIT Main modules and Analysis Flow
3.2.1.2 Nuclear DataBase
TFIT uses a Nuclear Database to evaluate any possible secondary particle pro-
duced by an atomic reaction between a neutron and the silicon atoms. Direction
and energy of those secondary particles are studied to account their interaction with
the sensitive volumes of the cell (previously computed by the tool). Depending on
the type of interaction, a current is injected while the output of the cell is monitored
to observe any possible electrical event (i.e. Single Event Transients).
3.2.1.3 TFIT Analysis on NANGATE 45nm OpenCell Library
The Nangate 45nm Open Cell Library [Nangate 2008] is an open-source, standard-
cell library provided for the purposes of testing and exploring Electronic Design Au-
tomation (EDA) flows. We have used the October 2008 SP1 version of the package.
The library contains 134 standard cells: 9 non-functional (fill, logic0-1 and antenna),
16 flip-flops (standard, with Set/Reset/Both, Scan), 5 latches, 102 combinational
cells, a half-adder and a full-adder. The combinational cells offer several logic func-
tions (AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR, XNOR, OR-AND, AND-OR, Buffers and
Inverters) with different drive strengths.
TFIT has been used to characterize the whole library. For each cell, the effects
of neutrons and alpha particles have been studied. The data gathered during the
analysis is too voluminous to be presented here. The following paragraphs and tables
present smaller sets of data for selected cases. The data presented in this paper is
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no way associated to real measurements or field, test data. We don’t benchmark the
Open Cell library against other solutions. However, the library doesn’t indicate any
particular weaknesses or negative aspect. On the contrary, the Open Cell library is
a very good vehicle for advanced studies and tool development.
3.2.2 Per-cells state SER figures
All the SER numbers are expressed in FIT (for a MegaCell). The overall SER
value is computed assuming equi-probable cell states; table 3.1 presents the SER
figures for the NAND2_X1 and table 3.2 presents INV_X1 cells. The observed SET
exhibit short pulse widths, with a very low rate of events larger than 75ps.
Table 3.1: SER Values for NAND2X1
State
Pulse Width
> 25ps > 50ps > 75ps
A1=0, A2=0 24 0.51 0
A1=1, A2=0 227 80.8 11.4
A1=0, A2=1 67.7 19.5 0.8
A1=1, A2=1 37.3 12.0 0.51
Overall SER 89.0 28.2 3.17
Table 3.2: SER Values for INVX1
State
Pulse Width
> 25ps > 50ps > 75ps
A=0 56.4 16.9 0.7
A=1 21.3 4.1 0.1
Overall SER 38.8 10.5 0.4
According to the results from the table 3.3, the most sensitive combinational cell
is the full adder FA_X1 cell. The sensitivity of this cell is comparable to sequential
cells. In addition, the cell exhibits an important SER for long SETs.
As a quick comparison, the table 3.4 presents the results for the DFF_X1 (flip-
flop) and DFFR_X1 (flip-flop with reset) cells. The reset state for the DFFR cell
is not sensitive and it’s not presented in the table.
3.2.3 Overall per-cell SER figures
The table 3.5 presents the overall SER figures (assuming equi-probable states)
for a selection of combinational cells. The SET pulse width threshold is set to 25ps.
The results of the sequential cells characterization are in very good agreement
with internal results from the radiation testing of same-generation test vehicles. The
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Table 3.3: SER Values for FAX1
State
Pulse Width
> 25ps > 50ps > 75ps > 100ps > 125ps > 150ps
A=0, B=0, CI=0 277 212 185 149 114 44.2
A=0, B=0, CI=1 231 167 101 70.2 42.2 17.2
A=1, B=0, CI=0 244 175 116 68.6 28.2 6.7
A=1, B=0, CI=1 309 236 200 140 35.5 0.8
A=0, B=1, CI=0 209 143 84.7 55.6 26.5 1.3
A=0, B=1, CI=1 377 276 227 163 78.6 3
A=1, B=1, CI=0 200 135 122 49.2 2.49 0.1
A=1, B=1, CI=1 145 78.4 33.4 5.37 0.1 0
Overall SER 249 178 134 87.7 41 9.2
Table 3.4: SER Values for DFF X1 and DFFR X1
CK D Q
DFF X1 DFFR X1
Neutron Alpha Neutron Alpha
0 0 1 179 84.2 169 246
0 0 0 151 192 200 109
1 0 1 146 125 321 305
1 0 0 283 298 82.1 108
0 1 1 179 84.2 157 246
0 1 0 161 192 200 88
1 1 1 108 125 312 305
1 1 0 289 298 88.5 108
Overall SER 187 175 191 189
presented combinational SER data don’t contradict a few available radiation-testing
results. Independent [Nakamura 2010] studies show the feasibility of using TFIT
for the SER characterization of standard cells and the good correlation of the tool-
provided data with results obtained from radiation testing of dedicated test vehicle.
The execution speed of the tool for evaluating the complete (125 cells) library is
around 12 hours on a Quad-CPU Core i7 (bi-core) server with 8GB of RAM. The
execution speed per cell ranges from a couple of minutes (most inverters and buffers)
to 20 minutes (most sequential cells and the more complex combinational cells).
Thus, it is perfectly feasible to characterize complex full standard cell libraries in a
reasonable amount of time.
3.2. SET Characterization of the Standard Cell Library 55
Table 3.5: Selected Cells SER
Cell AND2_X1 AND2_X2 AND2_X4 AND3_X1 AOI21_X1
SER 85.6 65.4 54 81.7 88.5
Cell AOI211_X1 BUF_X1 AND4_X1 AND4_X2 AND4_X4
SER 75.3 70.7 75.3 58.5 31.5
Cell NOR2_X1 NOR2_X2 NOR2_X4 OR2_X1 NAND2_X1
SER 54.6 45.8 27.8 102 89
Cell NAND2_X2 NAND2_X4 XOR2_X1 XOR2_X2 XNOR2_X1
SER 63.5 53.7 145 144 143
Cell XNOR2_X2 HA_X1 INV_X1 INV_X2 INV_X4
SER 151 147 38.8 21.6 17.1
Cell INV_X8 INV_X16 INV_X32 OR3_X1 OR3_X2
SER 14.4 1.9 0 92.2 67.9
Cell OR3_X4 OR4_X1 OR4_X2 OR4_X4 BUF_X2
SER 64.6 88.4 65.8 59.4 53.5
Cell BUF_X4 BUF_X32 OR2_X2 OR2_X4 NAND4_X1
SER 46.4 9.2 75.2 64.4 92.5
3.2.4 Transistor Contribution to the Overall Cell SER
The charge deposit and collection phenomena caused by the Single Event Effect
are usually represented as transient currents injected in the drain regions of the cell
transistors, with an added parameter: the cross-section, that represents the area
of the device that is sensitive to SEEs induced by a particle that deposits enough
energy (in the device (higher than the critical charge). However, while the LET and
the critical charge notions are not directly applicable to neutrons, the cross-section
value can still be useful to represent a measure of the neutrons interaction with the
cell. Thus, we can attach to each transistor of the cell a cross-section value for each
cell state that shows the contribution of the transistor to the overall SER per cell.
As an example, table 3.6 shows the contribution of each transistor of the NAND2_X1
cell (represented in the Figure 3.4) in the case of a considered SET pulse width value
of 25ps.
3.2.5 Single Event Transient SER: Influencing Factors
Several factors have an influence on the Single Event Transient SER, in this
paragraph; transistor sizing (cell drive strength), output load capacitance and supply
voltage have been analyzed.
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Table 3.6: Transistor SER Contribution
State/SER Cell M0 M1 M2 M3
A1=0, A2=0 24 0 24 0 0
A1=0, A2=1 67.7 0 0 67.7 0
A1=1, A2=0 227 165 62.4 0 0
A1=1, A2=1 0 0 0 18.6 18.6
Overall SER 89.0 41.25 8.53 4.65 4.65
ZN
A1A2
M0
A1
A2
M1
M2 M3
Figure 3.4: NAND2 Cell Schematic
3.2.5.1 Cell Drive Strength
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 show how the SET SER varies with respect to the drive
strength of the cell.
For the inverters (Figure 3.5) the SER decreases when the drive strength in-
creases. Buffers (Figure 3.6) represent a particular case since the sensitivity to long
transients is higher. This happens because if the first inverting stage generates a
transient, the second stage stretches the pulse making it longer. This behavior can
be observed in any non-inverting gate (AND, OR, AO, OA, etc.).
3.2.5.2 Output Load Capacitance
Figure 3.7 Shows the SET SER dependency with respect to the output load
capacitance. The picture shows that the output load capacitance affects only short
pulses. Whereas the sensitivity to longer pulses is constant no matter the output
load capacitance.
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Figure 3.5: SET SER vs. Drive Strength for INV from X1 to X32
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Figure 3.6: SET SER vs. Drive Strength for BUF from X1 to X32
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Figure 3.7: SET SER vs. Output Load Capacitance for MUX2
3.2.5.3 Supply Voltage
Figure 3.8 Shows the SET SER dependency from with respect to the supply
voltage. The picture shows that for different values of Vdd the sensitivity to short
pulses is constant, while the sensitivity to longer pulses decreases.
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Figure 3.8: SET SER vs. Supply Voltage for MUX2
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3.3 SET Propagation Analysis
Since the characterization of the standard cell library is now complete, we can
use the results for the SER analysis of any design implemented using the library. The
multiplier the Device Under Test (DUT) has been mapped to the Open Cells library;
obtaining a gate-level netlist with a total of 1657 cell instances. The cell count for
the most important cells is described in the table 3.7. Several sensitive cells such as
the full adder are preponderant in the netlist. The netlist is accompanied by a SDF
file that contains timing information for the cell instances and interconnections.
Table 3.7: Post Synthesis Design: Cell Count
Cell Count
FA_X1 327
AOI22_X1 286
XNOR2_X1 277
XOR2_X1 182
NAND2_X1 128
INV_X1 109
MUX2_X2 70
NOR2_X1 51
HA_X1 31
Other 196
The intended purpose of the multiplier block is to be used in a complex design.
Thus, the combinational multiplier will be sandwiched between two layers of se-
quential cells (usually flip-flops). Accordingly, the outputs of the block have been
connected to 32 DFF_X1 flip-flops. The flip-flops have been synthesized with the
remaining of the circuit in order to obtain accurate timing information (propaga-
tion/setup/hold).
The overall goal of the SET propagation analysis is to evaluate the percentage
of SET that are memorized in subsequent (flip-flops in our case) sequential/memory
cells. As attested by numerous research papers [Dodd 2004, Hass 1999b, Gadlage 2004,
Alexandrescu 2002, Reorda 2003, Nguyen 2005] the SET fault to Soft Error transfor-
mation is mitigated by several factors: the electrical, logic and temporal de-rating:
• The EDR represents the fault ability to propagate when taking in account the
deformation of the transient through the logic network.
• The LDR models the propagation of the fault through the logic network from
a purely logic perspective, according to the circuit state.
• The TDR represents the probability of the propagated fault to be present on
the sequential cell data input at the latching instant.
60 Chapter 3. Single Event Transient Analysis
In order to extract reference results and to evaluate the effort required for the
analysis of the design the most straightforward approach, non-optimized serial fault
simulation, have been applied. Then, more sophisticated methods have been bench-
marked with the results previously gathered.
3.3.1 Classic serial fault simulation approach
This approach consists in providing a testbench for the circuit (including a clock
signal to the output flip-flops), applying random test-vectors on the inputs of the
circuit, injecting a transient fault in selected cell outputs and observing the output
of the flip-flops. If the memorized data is different from the reference values, then
the injected SET has been propagated and memorized. Several simulations scenarios
are presented in the following paragraphs.
3.3.1.1 Logic De-Rating evaluation
The simulation campaign consists in 40 simulation runs during which the circuit
is exercised with 2000 test vectors. One injection site has been randomly selected for
each run. The primary (non-registered) outputs have been observed for evaluating
the fault propagation. The primary output of this campaign is the average logic
de-rating factor which is 32.29%. The relatively large de-rating percentage reflects
the mathematical function of the circuit and its relatively simple internal structure.
The considered multiplier block is exercised using two random 32-bits input
vectors. The input vectors are meant to represent binary32 IEEE 754-2008 single-
precision floating point numbers. As such, the input vectors can represent random
numbers and all the multiplier features (sign, exponent, significant computation
blocks) are used. The simulation can also accommodate specific configurations (test
cases) where specific number ranges are used in agreement to the needs of the appli-
cation. Accordingly, the logic de-rating numbers are expected to change, reflecting
the relative criticality of the individual cell instances with regard to the considered
test case.
3.3.1.2 Electrical/temporal de-rating evaluation
The objective of this campaign is to evaluate the deformation (Propagation
Induced Pulse Broadening - PIPB) of the SET from the origin to the primary output.
In addition, it will also indicate the shortest pulse duration that the logic network
is able to propagate. This information is particularly interesting since the SER
characterization of the cell library indicates that most logic cells only exhibit short
SETs (<100ps).
As an example of such simulation, we have selected two of the injection sites
with a high LDR, thus maximizing the number of propagated faults. The output
transient pulse width has been measured on each line of the 32-bit output, the output
transient duration is measured as shown in figure 3.9. We have performed several
simulation runs with different injected SET pulse widths and 500 test-vectors per
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run. The table of results is quite extensive, and the figure 3.10.a, figure 3.10.b and
figure 3.10.c only presents an average output pulse width (ps) versus the original
SET width (ps) for three different logic gates.
OUT[0]
OUT[1]
OUT[2]
OUT[3]
WORST
CASE
MAX
MIN
Figure 3.9: Output SET evaluation
The results show that short transients are not able to propagate through the
logic network. Depending on the path, the observed behavior can be very different.
The case shown in figure 3.10.a present a quasi-linear growth of the output pulse
width for pulses longer then 60ps. figure 3.10.b shows a very discontinuous behavior
for pulses shorter then 350ps, then the output pulse width duration converges to
a constant value. The last scenario, figure 3.10.c, shows a linear growth for pulses
shorter then 400ps, then, as for the case presented in figure 3.10.b, the output pulse
width duration converges to a constant value.
A more in-depth analysis of the circuit shows that the source to output paths
can be classified in linear and re-convergent paths. The linear paths will cause a
single transition for the starting edge of the fault and a second one for the ending
edge. The output fault width can be calculated using the original fault width plus a
deformation (positive or negative) caused by the difference in the various transition
times of cells from the path. However, the results show that this linear dependency
is only true for large (>200 ps) transients while shorter faults are characterized by a
non-linear regime. This may also be an artifact of the SDF timing models, requiring
an alternative approach. Re-convergent paths cause two sets of multiple transitions
associated to the two edges of the original fault with a correct signal value between
the two events.
The overall simulation time was around 5 minutes for 1 injection site, 24 pulse
widths values and 2000 test vectors. In this case, a straightforward approach consists
in optimized serial fault evaluation techniques [Alexandrescu 2002]. The duration
of the possible fault(s) at the output of the affected cell instance is retrieved from
the database, according to the cell characteristics, neighborhood and circuit state.
Individual SETs are serially injected, propagated and evaluated. The fault waveform
on the destination net is then integrated in order to retrieve an effective pulse width
duration.
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Figure 3.10: Output SET vs. input SET for three different instances of the design
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3.3.1.3 Temporal/logic de-rating evaluation
The primary goal of this simulation campaign consists in performing a fully
featured analysis of the SET propagation and memorization. Firstly, an injection
site is selected. Secondly, SET occurrence time (fault injection instant) is varied
from the beginning to the end of the clock cycle by proposing a discretization of
the clock period in 100 fault injection instants. Lastly, the simulation environment
evaluates whether the fault is memorized or not, for each fault injection instant. In
addition, several clock period values and several pulse widths have been analyzed.
The following results are provided by this approach: the dependence of the fault
memorization probability versus the fault occurrence instant (expressed in percent-
age: instant over clock period) (Figures 3.11.a, 3.11.b and 3.11.c), and a variety
of de-rating factors. As an example the evolution of the overall de-rating vs. the
working frequency and the source SET pulse width are shown in table 3.9 and table
3.8.
Table 3.8: Overall De-rating Factors for Different Frequencies Assuming a Fixed
SET PW
Source SET PW = 75 ps
Clock period [MHz] Overall de-rating
100 0.85%
150 1.22%
200 1.63%
Table 3.9: Overall De-rating Factors for Different SET PWs Assuming a Fixed
Frequency
Frequency = 100 Mhz
SET PW [ps] Overall de-rating
75 0.85%
100 1.90%
125 2.10%
150 2.675%
200 3.642%
The overall simulation time was around 35 minutes for each fault injection cam-
paign: 1 injection site, 1 clock frequency and 1 pulse width value.
The results of the serial simulation approach are certainly interesting. The over-
all de-rating factor (which is the product of the electrical logic and temporal de-
rating factors) is on the order of a few percent. This is a reasonable result because:
• SETs have a very small opportunity window to be memorized in a sequential
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Figure 3.11: SET latching probability vs. SET occurrence instant for three different
instances
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cell. Figures 3.11.a, 3.11.b and 3.11.c show that the vulnerable time slice can
be at different instant of the clock cycle but is always very short.
• For short transient pulses the circuit has a strong de-rating factor (typical for
most combinational cells). Table 8 shows that the de-rating factor grows with
the pulse width but also with the frequency of the circuit.
• Combinational cells have an intrinsic logic de-rating factor that depends on
the state of the signals. I.e. an AND2 gate will not propagate an SET coming
from one o its input if the other input is at zero. Consequently, combinational
logic networks present an inherent logic de-rating factor that could potentially
affect the propagation of SEE-induced faults.
All These effects, coupled with an intrinsic low SEE sensitivity seems to indicate
that the overall combinational cells contribution to the total circuit SER is limited.
Even if the simulation is far from being complete, considering the limited number
of test vectors and injection sites; we have spent considerable CPU time on a very
small logic block.
3.3.2 Accelerated SET simulation
In the following, we will investigate some of the available methods that will
reduce considerably the analysis time. We will make use of the following principles:
1. The ability to separately simulate the normal activity of the circuit (as induced
by a new test vector/clock cycle) and the events caused by a SET [Alexandrescu 2002,
Nguyen 2005].
The justification of this approach consists in proving that the SET must arrive
on the affected net after the net stabilization (following a new test vector) in
order to have an opportunity of reaching the correct opportunity window of
the memorization cell. Thus, we can safely simulate the normal circuit events,
wait for circuit to stabilize, inject a fault, evaluate fault events, and when
finished, inject a new fault. This differential technique will reduce considerably
the simulation time. A further optimization consists in evaluating the normal
circuit events using a fast (non-timing) simulator.
2. The use of a mathematical temporal de-rating computed as a ratio of the op-
portunity window and the clock period [Nakamura 2010].
The temporal de-rating can be quickly estimated using one of the following
equations 3.1 where δ represents the transient pulse width at the destination
(data input of the memorizing flip-flop).
P =
1
2
·
tHOLD + tSETUP + δ
TCK
P =
δ
TCK
(3.1)
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Using these formulas, we don’t have to simulate different occurrence instants
of the SET, with a huge economy of CPU time. The fault simulation will
provide the accurate δ values.
3. The use of a pulse prediction method based on the measured fault deformation
[Nakamura 2010].
This method relies on the linearity of the logic network to add a constant
deformation to larger (hundreds of ps) SETs. The implementation consists in
separately simulating the starting and ending edges of the SET and measuring
the deformation of the fault. Then, any output fault pulse width can be
computed as the sum of the original fault and the measured deformation,
eliminating the need to simulate the individual faults. However, since the
SER characterization of the standard cell library shows that most SETs are
shorter than 200ps, this method is not yet applicable.
4. The use of classic fault universe reduction methods
Reducing the number of cells considered during the analysis will also reduce
the time required for the simulation. However, some of the techniques available
with classic (permanent) faults are not directly applicable to SETs.
A very good optimization method could consist in using this method in con-
junction with the method 3): start by evaluating the fan-out of the cell that
drives a linear (non-re-convergent) path, then separately simulate the two
edges of the fault (as in method 3) and measure the delay up to and from any
cell on the fan-out path. Then, mathematical formula will allow the computa-
tion of the deformation induced by the path from any down-stream cell to the
logic network outputs, eliminating the need for simulating the down-stream
cells. Again this is not yet applicable. Finally, we have implemented a simple
fault dropping algorithm that eliminates some short faults based on the results
of previous fault injections.
The proposed techniques have been implemented as a shared Verilog Procedural
Interface (VPI) library that is load by the event-driven simulator at the beginning of
the simulation. In conjunction with the testbench, the fault simulation library ap-
plies a new test vector on the inputs of the circuit, waits for the circuit to stabilize
and then sequentially inject faults on all the cell instances outputs while record-
ing the events observed on the primary (non-registered) outputs. Then, it uses a
mathematical setup/hold model for a virtual flip-flop to compute the overall TDR
according to the equations 3.1.
The results are identical to the reference, serial fault simulation approach with
the added benefit of a huge increase in the simulation time. As an indication,
the simulation of 10000 test vectors with fault injections in each cell instance have
been performed in 17.8 minutes, while the equivalent serial simulation require an
impractical amount of time (several days).
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The conclusion of this analysis step is that optimized methods will considerably
improve the performances of the SET simulation. However, if we try to evaluate the
time required for simulating a full multi-million cell design, the considerably long
time required for the fault simulation, together with the engineering effort required
for setting up the simulation environment may make this approach impractical. In
the following we will quickly present a purely static, mathematical method that tries
to provide a very quick of the overall de-rating factor.
3.3.3 Static, probabilistic fault propagation approaches
The research community provides a wealth of solutions [Alexandrescu 2007,
Hass 1999a, Asadi 2005, Brglez 1984, Benso 2002] for the static analysis of the logic
de-rating in logic networks. We have implemented a very straightforward method
that uses a fault propagation probability metric associated to each cell. As an ex-
ample, inverter, buffers and XOR gates will always propagate transitions on their
inputs. AND or OR gates will conditionally propagate the transitions according to
the state of the other inputs. We note the probability for an input to be 1 as the
state probability S(input) and the propagation probability as P (input). For the
AND2_X1 gate, we can write: P (A1) = S(A2); INV_X1 has P (A) = 1 and so on.
The propagation probability of a non-re-convergent path can be accurately de-
scribed using the non-dependent state probabilities of its nets and the propagation
probabilities of the composing cells. Re-convergent paths may be explored by using
Shannon expansion to separate common terms (state probabilities) in some equa-
tions. The problem associated to this approach is that for some complex paths
(quite easy to find in the multiplier block), the equation becomes easily too com-
plex, requiring CPU time and memory. To keep the analysis time within reasonable
limits, we have implemented this algorithm with an optional hard-coded limit for
the number of variables to consider and a pessimistic approach (i.e. logic de-rating
= 1) for the equations that cannot be correctly evaluated.
The state probabilities of the logic network nets can be computed using the
same static, probabilistic method as used for the fault propagation probability com-
putation or can be gathered during a reference simulation run. We have added a
specific feature to the VPI simulation library that computes the state probability
for each circuit net as the ratio between the overall interval of time during which
the net/signal is in the high logic state and the total simulation time. This oper-
ation only requires a single, reference simulation that it’s relatively inexpensive to
perform and can also provide state probabilities according to the various test cases
thus improving the accuracy of the consequent static fault propagation probability
evaluation.
Table 3.10 presents the logic de-rating factors obtained through the previous
fault injection and simulation efforts and the logic de-rating factors obtained through
static methods. The circuit-wide, overall average and standard deviation logic de-
rating figures are computed from the de-rating factors associated to each cell in-
stance. The Full Fault Injection and Simulation row presents the results obtained
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using through simulation, without any optimization of any kind. Thus, these results
act as the reference data against whom the following methods are benchmarked. The
Full static signal probabilities and fault propagation analysis row presents the results
obtained using the static, probabilistic approach applied on both signal/net state
probabilities and also fault propagation analysis. The final Simulation-based signal
probabilities and static fault propagation analysis approach uses signal state proba-
bilities obtained through a reference simulation and fault propagation data obtained
through the static method. The results from this case are in a good agreement to
the reference results and have been obtained with a reasonable investment of com-
putational resources. The full static data is the least accurate and also the least
computational intensive. While the static analysis method deserves to be improved,
we can observe that the pessimistic results are always greater than the reference
data. Thus, we can use this inexpensive approach to easily establish upper bounds
to the logic de-rating factors for the various cell instances of the circuit.
Table 3.10: Overall Circuit Logic De-Rating Factors
Method
Full Fault
Injection &
Simulation
Static Fault Propagation Analysis
Uniform Signal
Probabilities
Simulation-Based
Signal Probabilities
Standard Pessimistic Standard Pessimistic
Average
LDR
32.3% 26.7% 38.6% 31.4% 35.9%
LDR
Standard
Deviation
36.2% 32.5% 33.0% 32.0% 34.0%
The logic de-rating factor for each cell needs to be accompanied by the temporal
de-rating. The chosen approach consists in using the state probabilities to evaluate
the fault deformation through each cell and compute the destination SET pulse
width using the initial SET PW and the deformation added by the path.
We have implemented the proposed approach as a stand-alone tool [Shi-Jie 2008,
Chapman 2010] using third-party Verilog and SDF file parsers. The multiplier block
is processed in a few seconds. A few select extracts from the results provided by the
static tool are indicated in the table 10. The presented data is computed using the
pessimistic tool option.
3.4 Conclusions
We have presented the results of a practical SET analysis flow that shows a
possible approach to the SET evaluation of a 45nm cell library and a design, efforts
performed in an industrial setting. The primary objectives of this project have been
the following: evaluate intrinsic combinational cell SER, analyze SET effects in the
design and contribute with tools and methodologies to the understanding of the
phenomena.
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Table 3.11: A few static de-rating results
Instance
Cell
Type
SET
PW
Simulation
Approach
Full Static
Approach
LDR TDR
Overall
DR
LDR TDR
Overall
DR
I0.p214... AND2_X4 75ps 100% 0.82% 0.82% 100% 1.29% 1.29%
mul_2683_33.p2... FA_X1 100ps 54.2% 1.24% 0.754% 62.6% 1.51% 0.95%
I11.inc_add.p33... HA_X1 100ps 23.5% 1.14% 0.29% 35.4% 1.45% 0.51%
The results seems to indicate that the combinational cell SER is usually several
times lower than same-library flip-flops and that the SET events are strongly de-
rated by electrical and temporal factors, reducing their contribution to the overall
SER. However, the reliability engineers and designers need to be equipped with
least-effort tools and methodologies in order to be prepared for future challenges.
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4.1 Introduction
Hardware is intrinsically unreliable. External and internal perturbations can
cause data corruption, faulty states and unpredictable circuit behavior. Single
Events Effects (SEEs) represent a particularly representative example of such is-
sues. SEEs are caused by energetic particles from the environment (neutrons, pro-
tons, heavy ions, muons, ...) or from the device’s own materials (alpha particles
emitted by radioactive contaminants). The particles deposit energy in the device
structures and cause transient [Dodd 2004] currents that affect internal signal states
and data stored in memorizing structures (memory cells, sequential cells).
Soft Errors (Single Bit/Cell Upset, Multiple Cell Upset, Multiple Bit Upset) in
memory blocks can be efficiently mitigated by well-known methods, such as Error
Correcting Code (ECC) [Mavis 2008].
Given the non-uniform structure of logic networks, code-based approaches can-
not be universally applied to individual elementary cells from the structure of com-
plex circuits. Thus, Single Event Upsets (SEUs) affecting elementary sequential
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cells (such as flip-flop and latches) require innovative hardening methodologies and
solutions [Makihara 2005, Jagannathan 2011, Loveless 2011]. Obviously, it can be
proven that the device can be made arbitrary resilient, with corresponding costs in
terms of development efforts [Almukhaizim 2008, Mavis 2007], silicon area, power or
performance overheads [Mohanram 2003]. While few areas (aero-space, medical, ...)
require an absolute SEU insensitivity (and thus the associated costs), many high-
reliability (networking, automotive, ...) applications need to integrate some level of
SEE resiliency. Accordingly, current efforts in both the industry and academy aim
at establishing a library of hardening approaches, offering tools and methodologies
to evaluate and to improve circuit behavior to SEU and ultimately, at providing an
adequate equilibrium between costs and benefits.
The work presented in this chapter contribute to the analysis and mitigation
of SEU effects in logic combinational networks. We will address subtleties in the
SEE behavior of sequential cells, evaluating the sensitive elements of the cell in
each primary cell state and possible SET/SEU effects in the cell. We will show
that transient in the internal clock circuitry can cause erroneous flip-flop activa-
tion [Seifert 2005]. In the considered technology (45nm), this effect is significant for
neutron-induced SEEs but not for alpha-related issues. Moreover, SETs faults are
possible in the transparent slave latch or output stages. We will de-rate their con-
tribution using Temporal De-Rating principles [Seifert 2004]. SEU and SET effects
are highly dependent on the cell (thus the circuit) state. We will highlight the need
for a fine-granularity, state-aware analysis of individual cell instances, that allows
workload-dependent SER results, with a better accuracy than using a single SER
value per cell type.
By analyzing simulation traces from typical applications, it is seen that in many
designs, a significant set of the flip-flops are biased towards storing a specific logic
value. For example, flip-flops that hold block enable signals are biased to 1 whereas
flip-flops that hold counters for rare error events are biased to 0. By very minor
logic manipulation, circuits can be modified so that these flip-flops actually store
the more stable value, from an SER perspective. In this way, a modest improvement
in overall circuit SER can be achieved with virtually zero area or power overhead.
The validation campaign support the interest of the presented approach.
The final goal is to sensitize reliability engineers and designers to the need for
high-fidelity SER analysis of sequential cells. Failure to perform an accurate SER
analysis for sequential cells can result in mis-estimation of the chip-level SER and
potentially over-design through unnecessary or incorrect mitigation.
4.2 Single Event Effects in Sequential Cells
Flip-Flops are the most widely used type of sequential cell and they usually
consist in two latches (master and slave - Figure 4.1).
SEEs can affect any sensitive cell transistor. The conventional approach is to
consider SEEs affecting elements from the currently memorizing (closed) latch as
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Figure 4.1: Flip-Flop Structure
causes for SEUs [Heijmen 2007]. As an example, during the second clock half-
period, blocked transistors from the master latch inverters are susceptible to tran-
sient events, causing the inverter output to change, perturbation that will be prop-
agated by the opposing inverter, eventually altering the stored value.
Obviously, the current cell state dictates the sensitive elements. Moreover, their
contribution to the overall SER depends on a wide selection of factors (implemen-
tation process, transistor sizing, node capacitance, physical and electrical neighbor-
hood, ...) [Heijmen 2004]. In all, the complete characterization of sequential cell
with regard to SEEs represents a sizable amount of effort and should result in a
set of event rate (expressed in FIT, Cross-Section) per condition, where condition
means a combination of any relevant parameters. However, our modest observation
concerning the current industrial SER efforts doesn’t seem to concur this require-
ment. Evaluating SER figures for complex designs (millions of flip-flops) is a rather
straightforward process. A single (or a very limited set) value per cell type is used
as a raw, intrinsic SER. Generic values (i.e. a single SER for all flip-flops types)
used as baselines are not unheard of. Given the fact that the actual cell SER is
a function of the intrinsic per-state SER and significant differences can exist for
distinct cell states, it is possible that the straightforward approach could produce
overall, intrinsic SER values that are not representative of the circuit behavior for
the actual workload. (Please note that we are not considering application-related
de-rating or vulnerability factors. The present discussion only addresses intrinsic,
raw SER values that are the base for further calculations).
SEU in the master and slave have been considered the predominant SEE-induced
issues in sequential cells. However, the primary physical phenomenon consisting in
transient currents injected in the cell internal nets may cause a variety of effects.
Depending on the occurrence site, we can enumerate them as follows:
• SEEs in the latches’ transistors or pass gates. The current assumption is
that this effect can mostly cause SEUs. If the deposited energy/charge is
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not enough to change the stored value in the latch loop, then it is extremely
improbable to propagate as a SET to the primary cell outputs, as it will be
strongly filtered by electrical aspects. We will show that, while possible, SETs
caused by particle impacts in the memorization loop transistors doesn’t impact
significantly the overall SER figures.
• SEEs in the output buffer/inverter stages. Primary cell outputs (Q/QN) are
typically driven by internal inverters, similar in function and structure to
the corresponding stand-alone combinational cells. SETs effects consists in
transient faults appearing on one or both outputs. While in terms of intrinsic
event rates, SETs are comparable (same order of magnitude) to SEUs, we
will show that a strong temporal de-rating can reduce the criticality of these
events, at least for low and medium-speed designs.
• SEEs in the internal clock circuitry. Clock signals are internally buffered by
inverter cells, equally susceptible to SET effects. If a transient fault appears on
the output of the clock inverters/buffers, the flip-flop will effectively perform
a new sampling. Depending on the value present on the flip-flop data input,
this event can cause or not a corruption of the previously-stored value with a
corresponding propagation of the fault to the primary cell outputs. From a
circuit perspective, this effect is similar to a SEU. The clock inverters exhibit
similar susceptibilities to SETs as comparable standard cells, representing a
significant contribution to the overall SER.
Finally, we propose a methodology based on detailed SER information for the
elementary cells and the evaluation of signal/state probabilities in the circuit using
data from functional simulation. We enumerate the requirements for a complete
SER analysis of sequential cells, requirements usable with both hardware (radiation
testing) and software (prediction tools) methods. Consequently, we will present a
framework for evaluating the per-state SER values for sequential cells, including
tools and methodologies.
4.3 SER Analysis of Sequential Cell States
In this section we will present the requirements of effective SER analysis of
sequential cells and practical ways to address them through hardware radiation
testing and software prediction tools. We propose a canonical set of 8 basic cell
states that reflect the various data/clock/input values cases. For each enumerated
cell state, SEU and SET event rates should be provided.
The required data can be obtained through actual measurement (radiation test-
ing, system testing, field data, ...) or prediction (simulation tools, analytic models,
...).
On existing circuits, flip-flop SER can be tested using existing scan chains. This
approach is limited to static testing: a pattern is feed through the scan-in input, the
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Table 4.1: DFF_X1 SER results
State S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
Clock 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Output 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Data 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
circuit is irradiated and scan-out data is verified to observe SEU effects. Through
careful pattern preparation and direct clock signals control (if feasible), the complete
table can be filled out with actual testing data. One major disadvantage is that SET
effects in output or clock circuitry cannot be easily discriminated from proper SEUs
in the observed events.
Dedicated SEU test vehicles are also feasible. In addition to a better control of
the flip-flop activity and adequate instance count, they allow dynamic testing (which
would allow a better understanding of output stages SETs), study of Multiple Cell
Upsets and so on.
In addition to testing, SER prediction through software tools is an useful ap-
proach to cell SER analysis since it’s able to provide earlier data and information,
allowing for an effective and timely SER management process. The works presented
in this chapter involved a SER analysis tools (TFIT) that uses nuclear physics knowl-
edge, in-depth process information offered by technology providers (foundries) and
a Single Event Effect analysis capability for completely characterizing sequential
cell SER in a given working environment and operating conditions. TFIT has been
extensively validated by the technology providers themselves; 90nm, 65nm, 55nm,
45/40nm, 32/28nm, 20nm, 16/14nm results have been correlated with radiation
test data from multiple foundries.
The Nangate 45nm Open Cell Library is an open-source, standard-cell library
provided for the purposes of testing and exploring EDA flows. We have used the
July 2009 version of the package [Nangate 2008]. The library contains 134 standard
cells, of which 16 flip-flops (standard, with Set/Reset/Both, Scan) and 5 latches. Full
library characterization has been performed with the TFIT tool using a 45nm generic
SER process database. As we are targeting a terrestrial (atmospheric) working
environment, we have studied the effects of neutrons and alpha particles. The data
gathered during the analysis is too voluminous to be presented here. The following
paragraphs and tables present smaller sets of data for selected cases. The full set of
data is available on request.
The SER information presented in this work is no way associated to real mea-
surements or field, test data. We don’t benchmark the Open Cell library against other
solutions. Neither the Open Cell library nor the presented SER data are intended
for benchmark or comparison against other standard cells library or silicon devices.
Moreover, the data is not meant to indicate any particular weaknesses or negative
aspects concerning the library. On the contrary, the Open Cell library is a very good
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vehicle for advanced studies and tool development.
4.3.1 SEU results for standard flip-flops
The table 4.2 presents the SEU (and SEU-like) event rates [FIT] for the DFF_X1
cell. The alpha results can be simplified to just four values, one for each combination
of clock and output (stored data) values. There is no sensibility to the input value.
In contrast, the neutron data can be grouped according to the same four primary
(clock, output) states, with an extra impact of the input data to the state SER.
This behavior is consistent with the statements from the previous section. The
slight difference in the neutron results is caused by the contribution of SET effects
in the clock circuitry.
Table 4.2: DFF_X1 SER results
State CLK Out Data Neutrons Alpha
S0 0 0 0 151 192
S1 0 0 1 161 192
S2 0 1 0 179 84.2
S3 0 1 1 179 84.2
S4 1 0 0 283 298
S5 1 0 1 289 298
S6 1 1 0 146 125
S7 1 1 1 108 125
Neutron-related sensitivity in states where the data input is different than the
stored value (S1, S2, S5, S6) is generally higher than states where input and stored
values are identical (S0, S3, S4, S7). The added contribution is basically the SET
susceptibility of the clock inverters. In the following, we will prove this statement.
As a support, figure 4.2 shows the internal organization of the DFF_X1 cell.
The TFIT tool is also able to present individual transistors contribution to the
overall SER. The results are presented in the table 4.3. Please note that zero values
have been replaced with dots for a better clarity. The presented data show that most
transistors have the same SER contribution, indifferent of the data input state. The
only notable differences are caused by the following transistors: MMP1 and MMN1,
MMP2 and MMN2. Figure 4.2 proves that those transistors belong to the clock
inverters (Figure 4.1). We can prove thus that SETs in the internal clock inverters
can cause an erroneous activation/sampling of the flip-flop and depending on the
data input and stored data state, effects that ultimately manifests as SEUs.
It’s worth discussing minimum pulse width requirements for the clock SET to
cause a SEU. We have found minimal SET pulse widths (PW) of 50 − 100ps, ac-
cording to the cell state. This estimation fits minimum CK pulse width from the
flip-flop datasheet (60 − 90ps typical). The computed event rates for SET larger
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Figure 4.2: DFF_X1 internal schematic
78 Chapter 4. Single Event Analysis for Sequential Logic
than 50ps in the clock inverters are very close (+/ − 20%) to SET SER data of
standard INV_X2 standard cell, which is similar to the actual clock inverter.
The presented results also suggest the importance of taking in consideration all
the 8 states of the flip-flop for any SER analysis efforts, through testing or prediction.
As an example, the radiation testing method that uses the internal scan-chain should
include test patterns that exercise the flip-flops in all the recommended states.
Obviously, flip-flops with Set/Reset/Scan Enable/Scan In inputs will exhibit
a higher number of possible cell states. However, from a SEE perspective, the
recommended 8-state analysis is still valid.
Lastly, alpha results show no sensitivity to the input state. The associated tran-
sistor SER data show no alpha-induced SETs in the clock inverters. This observation
correlates well with the very low or no sensitivity of comparable standard cells.
Table 4.3: DFF_X1 transistor SER contribution
Transistor S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
MMN2 . . . . . . 27 .
MMN6 . . . . 70.2 70.2 . .
MMN11 . . 66.5 66.5 . . . .
MMN10 48 48 . . . . . .
MMN13 . . . . . . . .
MMP2 . . 1e-3 . . . . .
MMP6 . . . . . . . .
MMP7 . . . . . . 53.4 53.4
MMP3 . . . . . . 53.4 53.4
MMP4 . . . . . . . .
MMP5 . . . . 20.9 20.9 . .
MMN7 . . . . 95.9 95.9 . .
MMP1 . . . . . 6.23 11 .
MMP8 . . . . . . . .
MMP9 51.3 50.6 . . . . . .
MMP12 51.3 50.6 . . . . . .
MMP11 . . . . . . . .
MMP10 . . 5.03 5.03 . . . .
MMP13 . . . . . . . .
MMN4 . . . . 95.9 95.9 . .
MMN3 . . . . . . . .
MMN5 . . . . . . 0.922 0.922
MMN1 . 11.6 5e-2 . . . . .
MMN8 . . . . . . . .
MMN9 . . 53.9 53.9 . . . .
MMN12 . . 53.9 53.9 . . . .
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4.3.2 SET results for standard flip-flops
As a further contribution of this work, we have performed a SET analysis for the
Sequential cells. The interest of this effort is to a) evaluate the SET susceptibility
of combinational stages (output buffers, internal inverters, etc) of the sequential cell
and b) investigate whether a SET is possible in the internal memorization loop when
blocked (memorizing).
As a first vehicle for this analysis, we have evaluated the SER behaviour of a
D-Latch in the memorizing or transparent states.
CK = 0
D
Q
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Q
cni ciCK = 1
Figure 4.3: Latch structure
Table 4.4 shows the SET and SEU event rates of the DLH_X1 cell for different
transient pulse duration. The gap between the clock high and low results can be
explained by Figure 4.3 that shows the cell’s structure for the two clock states. The
light-red areas highlight the SET-sensitive part of the circuit. The light-blue area
highlights the SEU-sensitive part of the Latch. When the clock is high, the latch
is transparent, since the memory loop is open it is impossible to have a SEU, but
the cell is still sensitive to SET. When the clock is low the cell is in its memorizing
state thus SETs are predominantly occurring in the output stages. Flip-flops ex-
hibit a very similar behavior to latches with respect to SETs with the added SER
contribution of the transparent slave latch.
While the presented SET event rate of 134 FITs for SET larger than 25ps is
comparable to the SEU event rate of 145 FIT, we must recall the need for a de-rating
based on an opportunity window metric [Alexandrescu 2002] (TDR - Temporal De-
Rating). In its simplest expression, the de-rating is given by equation 4.1.
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Table 4.4: SET and SEU SER for a D-Latch
DLH_X1
SET [FIT] for PW > than xx ps SEU
25 50 75 100 125 150 SER [FIT]
CLK High 134.0 84.8 35.3 23.7 0 0 0
CLK Low 38.8 10.5 0.4 0 0 0 145.0
TDRSET =
SET Pulse Width
Clock Period
(4.1)
Obviously, this de-rating can be only computed when the period driving the
flip-flop or latch. As an indication, the table 4.5 presents a few typical de-rating
values. According to the tables 4.4 and 4.5, a conservative (pessimistic) evalua-
tion of the SET contribution to the overall SER would only allow for a few FIT of
de-rated SET SER compared to hundreds of SEU FIT. These results seem to indi-
cate that sequential SET SER has a relative low impact (in a 45nm process). For
more advanced technologies, SET contribution is expected to worsen, with regard
to increasing intrinsic SET rates and lesser de-ratings.
From an experimental perspective, sequential SET contribution can be measured
by comparing the results of a dedicated, high-speed sequential test vehicle for two
testing frequencies.
Table 4.5: SET TDR de-rating
Freq/Period
SET TDR [%] for PW of xx ps
25 50 75 100 125 150
500MHz/2ns 2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15
200MHz/5ns 1.25 2.5 3.75 5 6.25 7.5
4.4 Master and Slave Temporal De-Rating
The Master and Slave latches of the flip-flop may exhibit different SER sensitivi-
ties. Moreover, the SEU propagation through the circuit network and its subsequent
memorization in a downstream cell is highly dependent on the fan-out path delay.
4.4.1 Long Paths
If the delay of the activated paths from the output of the affected flip-flop to the
input of the following flip flop is larger than first clock half-cycle, then, only errors
which occur early in the clock cycle can be captured in the following flip-flop. Thus,
the upsets must occur in the master latch. Any upsets in the slave will have to be
discarded, since they arrive too late to cause any damage.
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In this case, the time derating of the master latch can be expressed as a function
of the event opportunity interval and the clock period:
TDRMaster =
TCLK −Delay
TCLK
(4.2)
The de-rated Soft Error Rate of the flip-flop will be:
SERFF = SERMaster · TDRMaster (4.3)
4.4.2 Short Paths
If the activated paths are short, then, some errors from the slave when CLK = 0
and all errors from the master when CLK = 1 can be latched in the downstream
flip-flop. In this case, the time de-rating factors are the following:
TDRMaster =
TCLK=1
TCLK
(4.4)
TDRSlave =
TCLK=0 −Delay
TCLK
(4.5)
The de-rated Soft Error Rate of the flip-flop will be:
SERFF = SERMaster · TDRMaster + SERSlave · TDRSlave (4.6)
4.4.3 Further Comments
The propagation delay can be different for two outputs: Q and QN. However,
the difference will be small enough to safely ignore. This is especially true when
considering that the timing de-rating includes external delays which are bigger than
internal flip-flop delays.We can usually assume that the delay of the output stage is
insignificant with regard to external delay.
Please observe that the presented equations can be simplified back to the usual
TDRF lip−F lop =
TCLK −Delay
TCLK
(4.7)
SERFF = SERF lip−F lop · TDRF lip−F lop (4.8)
when a single SER value is available and the contribution of master and slave
latches is supposed equal.
Please note that the in-clock-cycle temporal de-rating concept should be ac-
companied by a supplementary analysis dealing with the effect of the clock gating,
widely used in complex designs.
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4.5 Cell State Analysis in Complex Designs
In this section, we present practical approaches and a tool framework able to
evaluate the state distribution of the various flip-flop instances in complete designs.
The design under test is an industrial 32 bit CPU design containing 190k se-
quential instances. Using a straightforward approach based on a single, average SER
value of 381 FIT, representing neutron and alpha contribution, we can compute the
overall intrinsic sequential SER as:
190000 cells · 381 FIT (per megacell) = 71 FIT (4.9)
This initial analysis can be improved per-instance cell state probability values.
Our methodology consists in a VPI simulation library, compatible with all principal
simulation tools that is able to monitor the activity of all design flip-flop instances
or sequential High Level Synthesis (Register Transfer Language (RTL)) signals. As
an alternative for the VPI simulation library, we have also developed tools able to
read and analyze a waveform file (Value Change Dump (VCD)). Independently of
the selected method, the proposed approach is able to evaluate very complex designs
with a reasonable investment in time, resources and effort.
The results of the a typical workload simulation are presented in the Figure
4.4. The histogram represents the bins of sequential cell instances according to
their state probability (time @ 0). Using per-state SER data from the previous
SER characterization of the sequential cells and state probability data from the
simulation, the table 4.7 shows a more accurate evaluation of the overall SER.
In the presented case, we have observed a slight (+7%) aggravation of the SER
rate wrt. to the straightforward method. In addition, a significant number of
flip-flop instances present a strong bias towards one of the 1 or 0 states. This
observation allows us to consider that these instances are good candidates for a SER
improvement approach based on preferring the flip-flop states with lower sensitivity.
Table 4.6: SER contribution per states
% of time storing "0" Instance Count SER @ 0 SER @ 1
0% 31697 15.6 0
5% 3872 1.8 0
10% 4451 2 0.1
... ... ... ...
95% 4029 0.1 0.9
100% 31732 0 7.4
TOTAL SER
58.4 17.7
76.1
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Figure 4.4: Sequential instances state distribution
4.6 State-Aware SER Improvement
4.6.1 Preference Towards Lower SER Data State
A potentially interesting SER improvement technique consists connecting the
flip-flops in a direct or inverted approach. The eventual costs of this modification
consists in adding inverters on the input and output of the flip-flop (Figure 4.5. If
an inverted output is available, the output inverter is not needed. Similarly, the
combinational logic network can be re-synthesized at no extra cost to provide an
inverted output. Potentially, this scheme has very low or no overheads and can
reduce to overall SER by a significant amount.
NOT
DFF
D Q
QN
0
1
DFF
D Q
QN
0
1
Figure 4.5: Optimisation through state reversal
Applying the method on the presented case study allowed an intrinsic SER
improvement of 19.3%, from the original 76.1 FIT to the new value of 61.4 FIT.
The design has 1.2M combinatorial cells and 190k flip-flops: 70, 000 X1 inverters
have been used, consisting in a +5% cell count increase, at a cost of less than 1%
area overheads. Since inverters are placed on mostly stable signals, activity factor
is low and thus a low dynamic power consumption overhead. The timing overhead
84 Chapter 4. Single Event Analysis for Sequential Logic
Table 4.7: SER contribution per states
% of time storing "0" Instance Count SER @ 0 SER @ 1
0% 31697 7.4 0
5% 3872 0.9 0.1
10% 4451 0.9 0.2
... ... ... ...
95% 4029 0.1 0.9
100% 31732 0 7.4
TOTAL SER
42.2 19.2
61.4
is equal to the propagation delay of an inverter.
The previous technique can be enhanced by the usage of flip-flops with a selective
transistor hardening. Their SEE figures may be highly unbalanced, presenting a
resilient, preffered state. This way, the potential hardening costs and efforts will be
minimized while conserving an overall good SER.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter aims at rising the awareness regarding the current need for a more
in-depth, sophisticated Soft Error Analysis of Single Event Upsets in sequential
cells. We proposed a set of requirements concerning the per-state SER analysis
of Flip-Flops and a framework of tools to fulfill the selected requirements. The
detailed data is then used together with updated temporal de-rating techniques
and state-dependent SER computations based on design state analysis. The overall
methodology allows better, more accurate overall results, that are representative
of the actual circuit application and usage. Consequently, we have investigated
a selection of SER improvement efforts based on state-aware optimization. The
proposed techniques allows for a significant reduction in the overall SER at very low
or no extra cost.
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5.1 Introduction
Silicon design must incorporate the effect of SEEs from the early stages of an Ap-
plication Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) design flow. The analysis methodology
should take in account SER characterization data of the underlying implementation
technology, derive circuit SER metrics from the information available at different
design stages and elaborate a SER characterization datasheet that predicts circuit
behavior in the field.
The TFIT tool [Hane 2008, Belhaddad 2006, Belhaddad 2008] aims at predicting
the SEE performance of standard and memory cells. The tool has he support and
backing of leading technology providers and has been proven to match the real, test
results for a variety of process nodes down to the latest FinFET technologies.
The SoCFIT platform provides modules and tools to analyze the propagation of
the SEE-induced faults from the output of the affected cell through the inner paths
of the circuit up to system and application. The tool implements the techniques
presented in chapter 3 and chapter 4 to generate an extensive report for the device
under test, providing intrinsic (raw) SER data (obtained from the TFIT tool), de-
rating factors and the final, application and implementation-specific SER figures,
representative of the actual behavior of the circuit in the system.
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The provided SER information will then help the designers to direct imple-
mentation choices, select a design hardening methodology, establish a failure recov-
ery/mitigation strategy and help the support engineers to accompany the final users
of the design in building reliable systems. SER prediction tools can assist in the
decision making of when and where to use a protection scheme on memories, use of
hardened-by-design flip-flops, or a globally optimized SER resiliency.
This chapter presents the results of the SoCFIT analysis of a complex commercial
CPU core. The analysis1 includes the following tasks:
• Logic De-Rating LDR analysis
• Memory De-Rating MDR analysis
• Functional De-Rating FDR analysis
The FIT results reported in this chapter are calculated from the raw SER re-
ported in [Alexandrescu 2013] for a DFF_X1:
• Neutron Sensitivity: 187.0 FIT/Mbit
• Alpha Particle Sensitivity: 349.6 FIT/Mbit
– assuming an alpha particle emissivity of: 0.002 α/cm2/hour
The design considered in this work was a single core implementation of an in-
dustrial 32bit CPU design containing 244, 083 flip-flops and 20.7 Mbit of SRAM.
5.1.1 Statistical Confidence
When we perform a series of fault-injection simulation runs in order to esti-
mate the probability, p, of a given outcome such as a SDC or DUE failure, we are
performing a series of Bernoulli trials.
There are different ways to estimate a confidence interval [Leveugle 2009, Evans 2012]
for a given value of α which is the level of confidence: α = 0.05 for 95% confidence.
If we assume that the distribution of p is normal, which for large values of n (number
of injected faults) is true due to the central limit theorem, then a confidence interval
is given by the following equation:
pn ± z a
n
r
pn (1− pn)
n
(5.1)
Where,
z a
n
= 1.96 (5.2)
For 95% confidence, and
pn =
1
n
nX
i=1
χi (5.3)
1The analysis only focused on flip-flop and memories since a synthesized netlist of the CPU was
not available. For the same reason, Temporal De-Rating (TDR) calculation was not possible.
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Where: n is number of injected fault and χi is a random variable that represents
the simulation outcome: χi = 1 in case of error and χi = 0 otherwise.
The results reported in Table 5.3 and in Table 5.4 include the error bars, which
are calculated using the formulas reported in this paragraph.
5.2 Logic De-Rating Analysis
As a first task of the analysis, the Logic De-Rating (LDR) was calculated .
As presented in section 2, the logic de-rating (LDR) represents the propagation
probability of the logic fault2 from the output of the affected cell to the inputs of
a sequential/memory cell. According to the state of the circuit (the values of the
signals and cell outputs3), the propagation of the fault is subject to logic blocking.
As an example, an AND gate with a low input will block any faults on the other
inputs. The evaluation of the logic de-rating is a common and well researched
subject in the reliability community. Many research papers, methodologies and
tools are available to help the designer evaluating the logic derating of circuits.
Standard simulators (compiler-driven, table-driven or event-driven) are perfectly
able to inject and simulate faults in very complex circuits and designs. In this work,
a specific fault simulation technique called Parallel Pattern Single Fault Propagation
(PPSFP) was used [Alexandrescu 2012]. The results of the analysis are presented
in figure 5.1 and in table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Flip-Flop Raw and derated SER FIT
Flip-Flop Raw SER FIT Average LDR Flip-Flop derated SER FIT
124.9 74.1% 92.6
The logic de-rating (LDR), although it can’t be used for application-specific
selective mitigation purpose, allows a quick (low cost) 4 circuit SER estimation.
The set-up and CPU costs are much lower, as LDR is calculated using static and
probabilistic algorithms.
5.3 Memory De-Rating Analysis
As introduced in section 2, the memory de-rating (MDR) [Alexandrescu 2011]
accounts for the fact that embedded memories do not always contain user-useful
2Sinlge Event Upset (SEU) for flip-flop
3SoCFIT considers uniform input probability
4The LDR calculation feature of SoCFIT can be very useful: it offers a quick solution for de-
rating the intrinsic raw SER by an objective, upper bound factor. If the SER requirement is not
very tight, LDR and TDR calculation can be sufficient to prove that the overall circuit SER meets
the requirement. If the application is very demanding, requiring very low final SER values, FDR
factors will help computing a lower, applicative, overall SER value than LDR (FDR includes LDR).
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Figure 5.1: Flip-Flop Logic De-Rating Distribution (Average LDR = 74.1%)
data. Furthermore, the memory locations are only vulnerable during a limited
opportunity window, allowing us to compute an objective de-rating factor. Figure
5.2 shows an example sequence of memory accesses. Equation 5.4 illustrates the
formula used to calculate the memory de-rating.
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Figure 5.2: Sequence of memory accesses
Memory DeRating =
(t2 − t0) + (t4 − t3) + (t7 − t6)
(Te − Ts)
(5.4)
The memory de-rating was obtained by running all the test-cases included with
the core source code and also by running the three benchmarks implemented for the
fault injection campaigns. All the read and write accesses were analyzed indepen-
dently for each word in each memory, the results of this task are presented in table
5.2.
This analysis was performed using a VPI library that monitored all memory
reads and writes and computed the fraction of time data was active (between write
to last read of the address, in the memory), then the simulation transcripts were
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Table 5.2: Average Memory De-Rating
Application
Average Memory De-Rating
Actual Pessimistic
bit count 0.4824 0.7268
qsort 0.4860 0.8185
simple math 0.4820 0.6777
app1 0.4563 0.6326
app2 0.0305 0.0659
app3 0.4308 0.6002
app4 0.4397 0.6045
app5 0.4308 0.6002
app6 0.3914 0.5919
app7 0.0279 0.0358
app8 0.5061 0.7067
app9 0.4007 0.6236
app10 0.1624 0.1624
app11 0.3620 0.3620
app12 0.3455 0.3455
app13 0.4957 0.4957
app14 0.0402 0.0723
app15 0.0368 0.0660
app16 0.0351 0.0678
app17 0.3715 0.5543
app18 0.3715 0.5637
analyzed with SoCFIT to calculate the memory de-rating for each instance .
There is some uncertainty if the overall address utilization, in the different con-
sidered test-cases, is representative of a real working system. To mitigate this risk,
SoCFIT was designed with two options for computing the memory de-rating. In
the Actual mode, it is assumed that the test-cases address utilization is correct for
the considered application. In this mode, the addresses in a memory that are never
used are assumed to be insensitive and are thus de-rated to zero. Conversely, in
the Pessimistic mode, it is assumed that those addresses that were never accessed
in a test-case would actually be accessed in the real system and thus the average
de-rating for the used addresses is applied to the unused addresses. Both values are
reported in Table 5.2.
Since all the SRAM embedded in the CPU were protected with ECC the overall
memory SER was not calculated (it would be 0). However, in several applications,
ECC is not always a possibility thus the memory de-rating can help designers de-
ciding whether or not implementing ECC for a specific memory.
90 Chapter 5. Derating Analysis of a Complex CPU
5.4 Functional De-Rating Analysis
As introduced in section 2, the Functional De-rating FDR [Shi-Jie 2008] eval-
uates whether the Soft Error has any observable impact on the functioning of the
circuit, board or system considering its actual usage. For this study, three represen-
tative benchmarks were selected and implemented. For each benchmark scenario,
three fault injection campaigns were performed. An initial fault injection cam-
paign allowed the calculation of an initial, design-wide, FDR factor. A second, fault
injection campaign based on a clustering approach [Evans 2013c, Evans 2014], pro-
vided finer-grained (per instance) characterization of the design. Lastly, a final fault
injection campaign enabled the evaluation of a hypothetical mitigation scenario im-
plemented using the data calculated from the initial and the cluster fault injection
campaign.
5.4.1 Fault Classification
To identify all the possible classes of failure, an preliminar fault injection cam-
paign was performed with a further application (Bubble Sort). The results obtained
from this fault injection campaign enabled the following failure classification (aligned
to the de-facto standard nomenclature for CPU design [Mukherjee 2008]):
• Silent Data Corruption (SDC):
– The simulation completed but the result was either wrong, incomplete or
missing.
• Detectable Uncorrectable Error (DUE):
– The run failed in an observable way:
∗ Simulation Completed and either an Error Indication or an Interrupt
signal toggled.
∗ CPU Timeouts (simulation not completed).
The cases where the simulation completed successfully but the simulation time
was not identical to the reference (golden) have not been considered errors.
5.4.1.1 Benchmark Application
Each application considered for the fault injection campaigns was designed to
have the same overall sequence (presented in the following and showed in figure 5.3):
1. INIT Phase
(a) The CPU is initialized
(b) The program and the data are loaded
2. BENCHMARK Phase
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(a) The application runs to completion
3. REPORT Phase
(a) The results of the application are copied in a test-bench memory, to be
verified during the analysis phase
As shown in figure 5.3 the actual injection of fault was performed during the
benchmark phase, so that
CPU initialisation Benchmark Results Copyback
Fault Injection
Figure 5.3: Fault Injection
The following benchmark applications, obtained from the automotive set of
MiBench [Guthaus 2001, MiBench 2001] suite, were adapted and used for the fault
injection campaign.
1. Quick sort (QSORT)
2. Simple mathematical operations (SMATH)
3. Bit count algorithms (BITCNT)
Quick Sort Algorithm Benchmark The benchmark executed a quick sort algo-
rithm on a 700-items array. The array size was selected in order to have a reasonable
execution (CPU) time.
The simulation time of the reference (fault free) simulation was 58318 clock
cycles (benchmark duration) and, the overall simulation, required 7.0 minutes of
execution (CPU) time.
Simple Mathematical Operations Benchmark The benchmark executed a
series of simple mathematical operations:
• 40 cubic equations
• 100 integer square roots
• 30 radians to degrees conversions
• 30 degrees to radians conversions
The simulation time of the reference (fault free) simulation was 67327 clock cycles
(benchmark duration) and, the overall simulation, required 4.5 minutes of execution
(CPU) time.
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Bit Count Algorithms Benchmark The benchmark executed 7 different bit
count algorithms. Each of them was executed 200 times.
The simulation time of the reference (fault free) simulation was 60265 clock
cycles (benchmark duration) and, the overall simulation, required 5.5 minutes of
execution (CPU) time.
5.4.1.2 Fault Injection
For each benchmark, three fault injection campaigns were performed :
• Initial fault injection campaign (5000 SEU injected)
• Clustered fault injection campaign (20000 SEU injected)
• Final fault injection campaign (5000 SEU injected)
Initial Fault Injection A random fault-injection analysis was performed in order
to obtain a first estimate of the actual FIT rate after functional de-rating. One of
the problems with a random, flat-analysis is that identifying the critical flip-flops
requires running multiple fault-injections for every instance, which is simply not
possible in a design with millions of flip-flops.
Table 5.3 reports the initial fault injection functional de-rating results and the
circuit failure rate calculated for each application for each class of failure.
Table 5.3: Initial Fault Injection Results and Overal SER
Application Failure
Flip-Flop Raw SER Functional Flip-Flop SER
[FIT/Device] De-Rating [FIT/Device]
Quick Sort
SDC
124.9
0.260% ±0.141% 0.32 [0.50-0.15]
DUE 1.000% ±0.276% 1.25 [1.59-0.90]
Math Functions
SDC 0.400% ±0.175% 0.50 [0.71-0.28]
DUE 0.941% ±0.276% 1.18 [1.52-0.83]
Bit Count SDC 0.720% ±0.234% 0.90 [1.19-0.61]
Algorithms DUE 0.920% ±0.265% 1.15 [1.48-0.82]
Average
SDC
124.9
0.460% ±0.108% 0.57 [0.71-0.44]
DUE 0.954% ±0.156% 1.19 [1.39-1.00]
SEUs were injected using the fault injection capabilities of the SoCFIT VPI
simulation library.
Clustering An exhaustive analysis of individual flip-flop instances is cumbersome
and costly for large designs. Objectively ranking the instances in terms of SER
contribution is not easily feasible. Partial hardening schemes are difficult to be
applied efficiently.
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A more scalable approach consists in grouping together flip-flops that have a
similar function or are related through objective criteria. Accordingly, the flip-flops
of a cluster will exhibit similar SER vulnerabilities. For example, in a processor de-
sign, it would not make sense to harden some bits in the program counter (Program
Counter (PC)) and not others [Evans 2013c, Evans 2014].
A clustering technique was thus deployed during this project. The flip-flops in
each block have been grouped into clusters by matching the instance names against
regular-expressions. Flip-flops in the same bus or with very similar names were
grouped into a single cluster.
Figure 5.4 shows the cluster size distribution.
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Figure 5.4: Cluster size (number of flip-flop) distribution
Using the simulation environment, fault-injection simulations were performed.
The number of fault injections was selected proportional to the number of flip-flops
grouped in the same cluster, with a maximum of 102 (100 + 2 to cope for possible
execution issues) fault-injections. Clusters smaller than approximately 32 bits were
not simulated. These clusters represent 0.35% of the total number of flops.
The simulation transcripts (initial and clustered fault injection) were then parsed
and the errors classified in SDC, DUE.
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 show, for the three benchmarks, the portion of the
design (%Flip-Flop) that caused DUE and SDC respectively.
Figure 5.7 shows, for each benchmark application, the portion of the design
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Figure 5.5: Portion of the design (%Flip-Flop) that produced DUE
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Figure 5.6: Portion of the design (%Flip-Flop) that produced SDC
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(%Flip-Flop) that caused DUE only, SDC only and both SDC and DUE.
6.022%3.557% 17.385%
72.691%
SDC
DUE
0.345%
NOT TESTED
QSORT
67.166%
SDC
DUE
NOT TESTED
SMATH
9.877%8.260% 14.353%
0.345%
6.767%6.610% 14.807%
71.472%
SDC
DUE
0.345%
NOT TESTED
BITCNT
Figure 5.7: For each application, portion of the design (%Flip-Flop) that produced
SDC only (light green), DUE only (light blue) and both SDC and DUE (intersection)
Final Fault Injection A further flat, design-wide, fault-injection analysis was
performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the hypothetical mitigation scenarios.
The data gathered from the initial and the clustered fault simulation campaigns
96 Chapter 5. Derating Analysis of a Complex CPU
have been used together to rank the flip-flops (clustered) in decreasing order of
criticality.
Table 5.4 reports the final fault injection functional de-rating results and the
circuit failure rate calculated for each application for each class of failure.
Table 5.4: Final Fault Injection Results and Overall SER before mitigation
Application Failure
Flip-Flop Raw SER Functional Flip-Flop SER
[FIT/Device] De-Rating [FIT/Device]
Quick Sort
SDC
124.9
0.280% ±0.146% 0.35 [0.53-0.17]
DUE 0.800% ±0.247% 1.00 [1.31-0.69]
Math Functions
SDC 0.380% ±0.171% 0.47 [0.69-0.26]
DUE 0.660% ±0.224% 0.82 [1.10-0.54]
Bit Count SDC 0.660% ±0.224% 0.82 [1.10-0.54]
Algorithms DUE 1.100% ±0.289% 1.37 [1.73-1.01]
Average
SDC
124.9
0.440% ±0.106% 0.55 [0.68-0.42]
DUE 0.854% ±0.147% 1.07 [1.25-0.88]
Mitigation Scenarios Flip-Flops to be hardened have been selected based
on clustering results: clusters with higher failure rates (SDC and/or DUE) were
protected first.
After all the clusters that produced an error were protected, the failure rate of
the processor was not zero. This is because the number of fault injections in a given
cluster may not have been sufficient to observe a failure. In order to extend the
available data, the flip-flops in clusters that are "close", within the design hierarchy
to those clusters which produced failures, were considered for protection.
Initially, clusters at the same 3rd level hierarchy were merged with the clusters
that were already protected. Then those at the 2nd and 1st level of hierarchy were
merged in, as well. This approach makes it possible to extract a maximum benefit
from the relatively modest number of fault injection simulation. These four different
criteria were used, in sequence, to select the flip-flop to harden:
1. Harden flip-flops with highest failure rate (from clustering) first
2. Harden flip-flops in third-level-modules (third hierarchical level) with highest
percentage of hardened flip-flops first
3. Harden flip-flops in second-level-modules (second hierarchical level) with high-
est percentage of hardened flip-flops first
4. Harden flip-flops in first-level-modules (first hierarchical level) with highest
percentage of hardened flip-flops first
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The improvement obtained with each criterion is highlighted (background color)
in the following charts (Figure 5.8 to Figure 5.16).
• The light-red portion highlights the SER improvement obtained with the first
criterion (clustering information).
• The light-green portion highlights the SER improvement obtained with the
second criterion
• The light-blue portion highlights the SER improvement obtained with the
third criterion
• The light-yellow portion highlights the SER improvement obtained with the
fourth criterion
The following pictures (Figure 7 - Figure 15) show the flip-flop-SER improvement
with respect to the percentage of hardened flip-flop , for each benchmark application.
• Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show the SDC and DUE rates improvement for the
quick-sort benchmark.
• Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 show the SDC and DUE rates improvement for
the mathematic benchmark.
• Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 show the SDC and DUE rates improvement for
the bit count benchmark.
• Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show the SDC and DUE rates improvement using
the average (three applications) DUE and SDC rates for the three benchmarks
to rank the flip-flop in order of criticality.
• Figure 5.16 shows the SDC and DUE rates improvement using the sum of
(three applications) DUE and SDC rates for the three benchmarks to rank
the flip-flop in order of criticality.
The results obtained (Figure 5.8 to Figure 5.16) show that the failure rates, both
SDC and DUE, can be reduced considerably by hardening a limited percentage of
flip-flops instances. As an example, SER reductions by ∼ 5X can be obtained by
protecting only ∼ 10% of the circuit flip-flops.
The key to this success consists in ranking the circuit features according to
their vulnerability using a clustering approach and then selective protecting the
most interesting candidates. Furthermore, this result can be achieved by running a
limited fault simulation campaign (90000 SEUs injected overall).
The SoCFIT platform has been instrumental in implementing this strategy and
have minimized the implementation and simulation costs.
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Figure 5.8: Quick Sort SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-
Flops when Selection is Made Based on Observed DUE Rate
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Figure 5.9: Quick Sort SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-
Flops when Selection is Made Based on Observed SDC Rate
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Figure 5.10: S-Math SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-Flops
when Selection is Made Based on Observed DUE Rate
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Figure 5.11: S-Math SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-Flops
when Selection is Made Based on Observed SDC Rate
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Figure 5.12: Bit Count SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-
Flops when Selection is Made Based on Observed DUE Rate
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
Protected Flip-Flop [ % ]
S
E
R
Im
p
ro
v
em
en
t
[
%
]
BITCNT SDC Rate Improvement
BitCnt SDC
BitCnt DUE
Figure 5.13: Bit Count SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-
Flops when Selection is Made Based on Observed SDC Rate
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Figure 5.14: SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-Flops when
Selection is Made Based on Observed average DUE Rate
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Figure 5.15: SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-Flops when
Selection is Made Based on Observed average SDC Rate
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Figure 5.16: SDC and DUE Rates Reduction Versus % Hardened Flip-Flops when
Selection is Made Based on Observed SDC+DUE Rate
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented an overview of a comprehensive SER analysis flow
that can be used by to evaluate and improve the overall SER reliability metrics of
complex devices. The goals of such SER analysis are the multiple.
First, the reliability engineer is able to characterize and document the reliability
figures of the design in order to prove that stringent customer-driven expectations
are successfully met.
Second, the application-specific SER figures of the design are evaluated using
a scalable approach that consists in grouping together flip-flops (clustering). The
implemented methodology for selective mitigation is based on coarse-grained fault
injection: Starting with the full set of flip-flops (i), they are grouped into clusters
using static information (ii). Statistical fault injection is performed for each of the
clusters to rank them based on their sensitivity (iii) and then a set of the most
sensitive clusters is selected for mitigation (iv) [Evans 2013c].
Third, the design flow-oriented methodology allows the reliability and design
engineer to share a common goal and use the same concepts and tools.
Finally, the outcomes of the analysis help the reliability engineer to choose the
optimal error handling methodology in order to meet harsh reliability constraints, to
ensure adequate data protection, to respect pre-defined system up-time constraints
and to provide support and maintenance to the final user during the lifetime of
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the product. Moreover, the methodology provides early results that can be used
in improving the circuit SER resilience through architectural and design choices
with the firm goal of improving customer experience when using high availability
products.
The results obtained allowed the development and evaluation of a hypothetical
mitigation scenario that aims to significantly improve the reliability of the circuit at
the lowest cost. The results obtained show that the failure rates, both SDC (Silent
Data Corruption) and DUE (Detectable Uncorrectable Errors), can be significantly
reduced by hardening a limited percentage of flip-flops instances. For the considered
design with, ∼ 250, 000 flip-lops, by running only 90, 000 fault injection simulations,
we showed an SER reductions by ∼ 5X (for both SDC and DUE) can be obtained
by hardening ∼ 10% of the circuit flip-flops.
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Radiation-induced soft errors are one of the major sources of failures in nano-
scale digital circuits. In addition to traditional safety and mission critical applica-
tions, mainstream systems must be designed to consider the reliability impact of
soft errors. The physics behind soft error phenomena are well understood although
the impact of new process technologies such as FINFETs and FDSOI are still being
studied. The research community offers a wealth of solutions for each step of the
design flow, for any practical representation of the circuit, with a large specter of
performance and facility of use, nevertheless, assessing the effect of soft errors on a
complex design remains a challenging task and the approaches taken in industry of-
ten involve large approximations. The techniques proposed in this thesis contribute
to better addressing these problems. As with any research, this document provides
a snapshot of the current state of the work, however, additional research is required
to further develop the techniques that have been proposed.
6.1 Single Event Transient Analysis
The first contribution of this thesis (chapter 3) concerns the Single Event Tran-
sients (SET) analysis.
SETs affecting combinational logic are considerably more difficult to model, sim-
ulate and analyze than SEUs. The working environment may cause a myriad of
distinctive transient pulses in various cell types that are used in widely different
configurations.
Chapter 3 presents a practical SET analysis flow that shows a possible approach
to the SET evaluation of a 45nm cell library and a design, efforts performed in an
industrial setting. The analysis flow consists in three main steps. The first step
concerns the technology characterization of the standard cell library: the TFIT tool
was used to characterize the Nangate 45 nm Open Cell Library. For each cell, the
effects of neutrons and alpha particles have been studied. The second step concerns
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the SET propagation analysis; this task included the Logic De-Rating - LDR, the
Electrical De-Rating - EDR (or Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening - PIPB) and
the Temporal De-Rating - TDR. Finally the overall SET figures taking into account
the particularities of the implementation of the circuit and its environment.
The results indicates that the combinational cell SER is usually several times
lower than same-library flip-flops and that the SET events are strongly de-rated
by electrical and temporal factors, reducing their contribution to the overall SER.
However, the reliability engineers and designers need to be equipped with least-effort
tools and methodologies in order to be prepared for future challenges.
As a further contribution some of the SET-SER influencing factors were ana-
lyzed, this includes: the cell drive strength, the output load capacitance and cell
supply voltage.
6.2 Single Event Analysis for Sequential Logic
The first contribution of this thesis (chapter 3) concerns the Single Event Upset
(SEU) analysis.
Single Event Effects in sequential logic cells represent the current target for
analysis and improvement efforts in both industry and academia.
Chapter 4 presents a state-aware analysis methodology that improves the accu-
racy of Soft Error Rate data for individual sequential instances based on the circuit
and application: a set of requirements concerning the per-state SER analysis of
Flip-Flops are presented. The detailed data is then used together with updated
temporal de-rating techniques and state-dependent SER computations based on de-
sign state analysis. The overall methodology allows better, more accurate overall
results, which are representative of the actual circuit application and usage.
Furthermore, the intrinsic imbalance between the SEU susceptibility of different
flip-flop states is exploited to implement a low-cost SEU SER improvement strategy;
by evaluating the state probability for each sequential cell
As a further contribution, an SET analysis for the Sequential cells was per-
formed. The interest of this effort is first, to evaluate the SET susceptibility of
combinational stages (output buffers, internal inverters, etc.) of the sequential cell
and second, investigate whether a SET is possible in the internal memorization
loop when blocked (memorizing). The results obtained with the TFIT tool for a
D − LATCH shows a strong difference (∼ 3.5X) between the transparent state
(clock high - more sensitive) and the latching state (clock low - less sensitive).
6.3 Derating Analysis of a Complex CPU
Chapter 5 presents the results of a comprehensive functional analysis of an in-
dustrial 32bit CPU containing 244, 083 flip-flops and 20.7 Mbit of SRAM. The anal-
ysis included the logic, memory and functional de-rating computation. Accelerated
simulation techniques (probabilistic calculations, clustering, parallel simulations)
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have been proposed and evaluated in order to develop an industrial validation en-
vironment, able to take into account very complex circuits with reasonable efforts
(manpower and CPU time).
The LDR was calculated using specific fault simulation technique called PPSFP,
considering uniform input probability while the dynamic (simulation-based) analyses
(MDR and FDR) were performed using three representative applications obtained
from the automotive set of MiBench benchmark suite.
For each benchmark application, three fault injection campaigns were performed.
An initial fault injection campaign allowed the calculation of an initial, design-wide,
FDR factor. A second, fault injection campaign based on a clustering approach,
provided finer-grained (per instance) characterization of the design. Lastly, a final
fault injection campaign enabled the evaluation of a hypothetical mitigation scenario
implemented using the data calculated from the initial and the cluster fault injection
campaigns.
This methodology [Evans 2013c] used for selective mitigation is based on coarse-
grained fault injection: starting with the full set of flip-flops (i), they are grouped
into clusters using static information (ii). Statistical fault injection is performed for
each of the clusters to rank them based on their sensitivity (iii) and then a set of
the most sensitive clusters is selected for mitigation (iv).
The results obtained allowed the development and evaluation of a hypothetical
mitigation scenario that aims to significantly improve the reliability of the circuit at
the lowest cost. The results obtained show that the failure rates, both SDC (Silent
Data Corruption) and DUE (Detectable Uncorrectable Errors), can be significantly
reduced by hardening a limited percentage of flip-flop instances. For the considered
design with, ∼ 250, 000 flip-flops, by running only 90, 000 fault injection simulations,
we showed an SER reductions by ∼ 5X (for both SDC and DUE) can be obtained
by hardening ∼ 10% of the circuit flip-flops.
6.4 Summary
In the years to come, electronics will play an increasingly critical role in all
aspects of everyday life, technology’s evolution will allow building more and more
complex devices integrating increasingly complex functionalities. In many applica-
tions the highest level of reliability is essential and there is a great need for techniques
to analyze complex systems and evaluate the impact of technology level faults.
Analysis of complex systems requires adequate techniques in order to scale with
the increasing complexity. The key contribution of this thesis is to provide indus-
trial solutions and methodologies for the areas of terrestrial applications requiring
ultimate reliability (telecommunications, automotive, medical devices, etc.) to com-
plement previous work on Soft Errors traditionally oriented aerospace, nuclear and
military applications. The Methodologies, the algorithms and the CAD tools pro-
posed and validated as part of the work are intended for industrial use and have
been included in a commercial CAD framework that offers a complete solution for
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assessing the reliability of circuits and complex electronic systems.
Appendix A
Flip-Flop SEU Reduction through
Minimization of the Temporal
Vulnerability Factor (TVF)
This appendix presents the results of a collaborative research project between
IROC Technologies and Intel Israel. The content is based on a paper which was
presented at IOLS 2015 [Evans 2015].
A.1 Introduction
In large SoCs, managing the effects of soft-errors in flip-flops is essential. Numer-
ous hardened flip-flop designs [Calin 1996, Lee 2010, Mitra 2007, Nicolaidis 2008,
Omana 2010] exist and there are many approaches to selectively replace the most
functionally critical flip-flops with hardened cells [Seshia 2007, Mirkhani 2005]. This
approach is very effective, but it can only be used when a hardend flip-flop design
is available. In some cases, such cells are not available and alternative approaches
for mitigating flip-flop SER must be explored. It is well known that not all SEUs in
flip-flops propagate due to logical and temporal masking effects. The logic function
of a circuit is determined by the design requirements, so little can be done to mod-
ify the logical masking factor. However, flip-flop SEUs are most likely to propagate
along paths where there is significant slack. By inserting padding on these paths,
the temporal vulnerability factor (TVF) can be minimized, reducing the probability
that SEUs are propagated.
In this appendix, we review how the TVF of a circuit can be modelled and we
investigate the extent to which the TVF of a circuit can be modified in order to
minimize the propagation of SEUs. Of course, the added delay must not impact
the critical paths, meaning the setup constraints must be respected. The amount
of padding to be added can be calculated using linear programming. The extra
cost of the padding, in terms of area and power can be estimated and included as
constraints in the optmization problem. The proposed technique has been applied
to eight benchmark circuits.
A.2 Overview of SEU Masking Factors
SEU Temporal Vulnerability It is well known that the majority of SEUs in flip-
flops do not propagate. In a synchronous circuit, in order for a SEU to propagate,
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it must be sampled by the downstream sequential elements. This implies that the
upset must occur sufficiently early in the clock period in order for the erroneous
value to meet the setup time of one or more downstream flip-flops. In this work,
we focus exclusively on synchronous circuits using master-slave flip-flops and make
the assumption of a clock with a symmetric duty cycle, as shown in figure A.1.
During the first half of the clock cycle (CLK=1), the master latch is opaque and
thus susceptible to SEUs and during the second half of the clock period (CLK=0),
the slave latch is opaque, and thus vulnerable.
Master Slave
Comb.
Logic
Master Slave
DFF DFFtprop
Figure A.1: Master-Slave Flip-Flops
An early, in-depth study of the temporal masking of SEUs is presented in
[Seifert 2004]. In this work, the authors propose the notion of the Temporal Vul-
nerability Factor (TVF) which is a measure of the likelihood that an upset will be
captured in a downstream flip-flop, based on temporal considerations. The TVF is
shown to be inversely proportional to the logic propagation time (∆tproptot ), as shown
in equation A.1. The authors performed a series of circuit simulations using spice
while injecting faults at different points in time through a full clock cycle. A graph
of the observed results for latches and flip-flops is reproduced in figure A.2.
TVF ∝
Tclk − (∆t
prop
tot +∆t
setup +∆tclk)
Tclk
(A.1)
Figure A.2: Spice Simulation of SEUs in Latches and Flip-Flops [Seifert 2004]
If the nominal SER value for the flip-fop is defined as the sum of the static SER
of the master and slave latches (SERFF = SERm + SERs), then it is clear that
the TVF can never exceed 0.5, since only one of the master or slave latches are
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susceptible at any point in time. In some cases, the intrinsic SER of a flip-flop is
expressed as SERFF = 0.5 ·SERm+0.5 ·SERs. With this definition, the TVF can
be in the range of 0..1. In fact, the results of the simulations in [Seifert 2004] show
that when tprop ≈ 0, the TVF value is actually lower than 0.5 as seen in figure A.2.
This is because there are intrinsic delays in the flip-flop (e.g. CLK → Q) as well as
in the interconnect. This simple relationship is further complicated by the fact that
when tprop ≈ tcyc, the clock nodes are highly susceptible to upsets which produce
jitter and can provoke a downstream setup violation.
In a real circuit, one flip-flop can feed multiple end-points through logic paths
with different delays, as shown in figure A.3. Thus, depending on when an upset
occurs, it may propagate to some, but not all of the end-points. In order for a
SEU to be fully blocked, it must occur sufficiently late in the cycle that it can not
propagate along even the shortest path. Thus, a safe value for the TVF factor which
represents the probability that an upset will propagate to none of the end-points,
is given by equation A.2, where ∆tpropi,j is the propagation delay from start-point i
to end-point j.
TV Fmin(i) ∝ 1−
N
min
j
 
∆tpropi,j +∆t
setup +∆tclk
Tclk
!
(A.2)
D Q D Q
D Q
D Q
Q
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C
Figure A.3: Multiple Downstream Paths
SEU Logical Vulnerability A fault is logically masked if it can not propagate
through the gates in the combinatorial logic network based on their logic function.
In processor applications, the notion of AVF [Mukherjee 2008], is used to measure
the probability that a fault propagates. In other work, this notion is referred to as
the logical de-rating factor (LDR) [Nguyen 2005].
This probability depends on the input vectors, or for processors, on the applica-
tion that is running. In this work, since the focus is on TVF, we assume that a LDR
factor can be calculated for each flip-flop. In the experimental work, the LDR is
calculated based on fault simulation as described in [Alexandrescu 2012]. The total
SEU rate can then be estimated using equation A.3.
SERSEU =
X
i2FF
(SERnomi · TV Fmin(i) · LDR(i)) (A.3)
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SET Contribution The overall SER contribution from single event transients
(SETs) is normally smaller than that from SEUs [Gill 2009], primarily due to the
additional latch-window masking effect. The proposed approach to SER minimiza-
tion consists of adding additional gates. In effect, we are trading a small increase in
SET SER in exchange for additional masking of SEUs1.
Many authors have proposed approaches for computing the overall effect of
SETs incorporating all the masking effects (electrical, logical and latch-window)
[Hayes 2007, Miskov-Zivanov 2006, Ramakrishnan 2008, Rajaramant 2006]. The fo-
cus in this work is to use a simple model for SETs that can : (i) account for the
SET contribution in the original circuit and (ii) account for the increase in SETs
as the result of the added delay gates. Therefore, we ignore the electrical mask-
ing and consider the logical and latch-window masking independently, as shown in
equation A.4. This equation gives the rate at which SETs get sampled in a flip-flop.
A further de-rating could be applied, since not every error that reaches a flip-flop
propagates to a primary output.
SERSET =
X
i2gates
✓ X
pw2PW
SERnomi (pw) ·
pw
Tclk
· LDR(i)
◆
(A.4)
SERnomi (pw) represents the FIT
2 rate for transient pulses of width pw for the
given gate. This sensitivity can be represented as a distribution where the FIT
rate for transients within a set of discrete ranges can be determined by simulation
[Costenaro 2013a], as illustrated in figure A.4 for two gates taken from the Nangate
45nm library [Nangate 2008]. The pw
Tclk
factor represents the latch window masking
effect. Finally, the LDR(i) factor represents the probability that a fault in a gate
will propagate logically and can be calculated using fault simulation.
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Figure A.4: SET Sensitivity of two 45nm Combinatorial Gates
1By reducing the timing margin on certain paths, it is also possible that there is a small increase
in the risk of delay faults.
2FIT = Failure in T ime. One FIT is one failure in 109 operating hours.
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A.3 TVF Optimization
In [Bramnik 2013], it was shown that by increasing the logic propagation delay,
the TVF, and thus the overall SER, can be reduced. This work, however, did
not discuss how to select on which paths TVF should be optimized, nor did it
quantitatively consider the resulting area and power overheads, nor did it consider
the increase in combinatorial SER due to the SETs that may occur in the additional
gates. In the current work, we show how linear programming can be used to apply
the TVF optimization technique while still respecting bounds on the acceptable area
and power overheads. Using a linear model is attractive since modern solvers can
deal with a large number of variables. In [Alexandrescu 2014], linear programming
was used effectively to select optimal ECCs for memories and here we expand this
to TVF minimization.
Problem Formulation Starting with an original circuit, as shown in figure A.5(a),
the problem consists of selecting the amount of extra delay that can be inserted ei-
ther at the input or at the output of the flip-flops, as shown in figure A.5(b). The
problem thus consists of selecting values for d1q..dnq and d1d..dnd subject to the
correct constraints.
FF1
FF2
FF4
FF5
FF6
FF3
(a) Original Circuit
FF1
FF2
FF4
FF5
FF6
FF3
d1q
d2q
d3q
d4q
d5d
d6d
(b) Modified Circuit
Figure A.5: Original and Modified Circuits
Using a static timing analysis (STA), the slack between any two flip-flops can be
extracted. This array can be expressed as a NxN matrix where each entry indicates
the slack from a given start point to a given end point, as shown in equation A.5
for the example circuit in figure A.5(a). Note that the slack time reported by the
STA tool, includes the time required to meet the setup constraints (∆tsetup) and
also accounts for the uncertainity in the clock network (∆tclk). The slack, thus
represents the total amount of additional delay that could potentially be added on
the given path.
Note that for simplicity, in this work, the timing paths from the primary inputs
and to the primary outputs have been ignored, although the inclusion of such paths
does pose any particular difficulties, but would require knowledge of the timing
constraints of the adjacent circuits.
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0 0 0 0 s15 0
0 0 0 0 s25 0
0 0 0 0 0 s36
0 0 0 0 0 s46
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
(A.5)
For the example circuit, the constraints that must be respected when selecting
d1q..dnq and d1d..dnd is that the setup time must still be met. In other words, the
added delay must not exceed the available slack which can be expressed as :
d1q + d5d <= s15
d2q + d5d <= s25 (A.6)
d3q + d6d <= s36
d4q + d6d <= s46
We propose to introduce padding by simply adding chains of buffers, either on
the inputs or outputs of the flip-flops. However, we must pose a constraint on the
delay variables (dnq,dnd) such that they must be either zero (no modification), or
at least one minimal buffer delay. This type of constraint is supported by the solver
[Berkelaar 2008] through the use of semi-continuous variables.
Cost Function The equation for TVF based on the fastest path (equation A.2),
is not linear and thus can not be directly used as a cost function. When a flip-flop
has paths with multiple end points, adding padding such that the propagation is
prevented on some paths can still reduce the risk that a SEU produces an error,
even if the fault still propagates to some endpoints. Therefore, we use an average
TVF along all the paths, as shown in equation A.7.
TV Favg(i) ∝ 1−AVG
j
 
∆tpropi,j +∆t
setup +∆tclk
Tclk
!
(A.7)
Building on the equation for average TVF, the sum of the SEU and SET SER
of a circuit can be expressed as shown in equation A.8. In this equation, the
TV Favg(i) for flip-flops has a linear relationship with the variables for the added
delay (d1Q..dnQ, d1D..dnD).
The number of buffers that are actually inserted must be an integer but depends
linearly with the amount of delay. These additional buffers contribute to the second
term which represents the combinatorial SER. The intrinsic SET sensitivity of the
buffer (SERnomi (pw)) is fixed, based on the type of gate. For each buffer inserted
at the output of a flip-flop, the LDR for SETs in that buffer is identical to the LDR
of that flip-flop, as the SET would have to propagate through the same downstream
logic. For buffers added at the input of a flip-flop, the LDR is 1.0, as there is no
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intervening logic. In this way, the effect of the added delay can be modelled as
having a linear effect on the overall circuit SER.
There are limitations on the accuracy of this linear model but it makes it possible
to quickly optimize the amount of inserted delay, by preferentially placing it where
errors are most likely to propagate, while still respecting the setup constraints.
SER(d1Q..dNQ, d1D..dNd) =X
i2FFs
 
SERnomi · TV Favg(i) · LDR(i)
!
+
X
i2gates
 X
pw2PW
SERnomi (pw) ·
pw
Tclk
· LDR(i)
!
(A.8)
In this section, we have identified a cost function which expresses the overall SER
as a function of the average TVF which itself depends on the propagation delays
between flip-flops. This cost function also accounts for the added SET sensitivity
due to the additional buffers. This function can be minimized, subject to the setup
time constraints which have been expressed in terms of the available slack reported
by a STA tool. In the following section, we develop additional constraints which
account for the area and power overhead associated with the additional padding
delay.
A.4 Area and Power Constraints
Area Cost Constraints It is assumed that the incremental delay of a single
buffer (BUF_X1) is fixed (≈50 ps) based on a standard loading of 0.48 fF. Only
an integer number of buffers can be inserted, thus the actual delay may be slightly
lower than the solution from the linear solver which uses continuous variables. The
total area overhead is estimated by multiplying the number of added buffers by the
area of a single BUF_X1 cell (0.798 µmm2) and does not account for the impact of
additional routing.
Power Cost Constraint From fault simulations, the switching activity factor
(AFi) for each flip-flop is known. The total power for the added gates can be
expressed as the sum of a fixed static component (pstatic) plus a dynamic component
that depends on the frequency of the circuit and the activity factor of the signal, as
shown in equation A.9.
P =
X
j2BUF
⇣
Pstatic +AFi · FREQ · Pdyn
⌘
(A.9)
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A.5 Experimental Results
Original Circuits Six benchmark circuits from the ISCAS and ITC [Corno 2000]
suites and two arithmetic and cryptographic circuits from Opencores [Opencores 2013]
were selected, covering different design sizes and operating frequencies. These were
synthesized into the Nangate 45nm library [Nangate 2008] based on typical process
and the clock frequency was maximized (zero slack), so that the clock period was
appropriate based on the number of layers of logic. In practice, some positive timing
margin is required to allow for variability.
The SER of all gates has been determined using simulation techniques described
in [Costenaro 2013a] taking into account the neutron contribution (JEDEC) and the
alpha contribution for an alpha emmissivity of 0.001 α/cm2/hour. Using fast paral-
lel fault simulation, the LDR for flip-flops and combinatorial gates was simulated for
uniform random input vectors based on 100 000 fault injections per flip-flop or gate.
Then, using equation A.3, the initial SER of each of these circuits was calculated.
The results prior to mitigation are shown in table A.1.
During this analysis, only the internal timing paths from flip-flops to flip-flops
were considered. The paths to and from primary inputs and outputs were ignored.
Nothing in the proposed approach precludes considering external paths but this
would require making assumptions on the input and output timing constraints.
The FIT rates are reported in units of µFIT since the total FIT contribution of
such tiny circuits is very small. The column labelled Eff. SEU SER, shows the SEU
FIT rate after the TVF and logical de-rating have been applied.
Table A.1: Initial Synthesis and SER Results
Circuit Num Num Period Num. Raw SEU Eff SEU
FFs Gates (ns) Paths SER (µFIT ) SER (µFIT)
s1488 5 379 0.72 78 2034 254
b06 9 47 0.37 63 3195 341
s400 21 114 0.5 311 7455 1308
b05 34 421 1.37 1064 12070 4663
b07 49 397 0.51 1559 17395 2370
s9234 145 701 0.76 3754 51475 19951
or1200 214 5192 5.86 13716 75970 25488
aes_core 554 12252 1.09 14986 196670 66637
The slack histograms for two of the circuits are shown in figure A.6. We see
that in the b06 circuit (figure A.6(a)), there are no paths with large slack, thus
intuitively, we expect that by adding a small amount of padding on the remaining
paths, the TVF can be made very low. On the other hand, in the OR1200, there
are many paths with large slacks. It is thus clear that a huge number of gates are
required to pad all these paths, especially given the longer clock period (5.86 ns).
Unconstrained Results The solver was initially run with no area or power con-
straints. In this case, the paths were padded to the maximum amount possible. The
results, in terms of SER reduction and increased area are shown in table A.2.
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Figure A.6: Slack Histograms for two Circuits
Table A.2: SER After Unconstrained TVF Reduction
New SEU SER SET SER Added Added Area
Circuit FF Reduction Increase Gates Gates Increase
µFIT % % Q D %
s1488 133 50 2.5 4 0 0.7
b06 138 60 0.2 0 2 1.9
s400 7455 74 142 2 25 11.1
b05 3139 33 9 15 233 32
b07 1833 23 76 0 34 4.2
s9234 8692 50 6 71 318 23.6
or1200 10428 78 812 5459 2010 71.4
aes_core 18994 71 25 2192 720 14.3
We see that the results are highly variable. Small circuits such as b06 which
has a very short clock period and a tight slack histogram (figure A.6(a)), show
signficant SER reduction by adding just a few gates. Larger circuits with a longer
clock period, such as OR1200, require significantly more area to achieve the maximal
SER reduction.
In the absence of constraints, the solver adds padding until the paths were max-
imally long. Due to the fact that one flip-flop can feed multiple end-points and that
these end-points may share common start points, it is not possible to make the slack
zero on all paths. Consider the example shown in figure A.7. Let us assume that
the paths from FF1 → FF4 and FF3 → FF5 have zero slack. Then, even though
the paths starting from FF2 have slack, it is not possible to pad either the start or
end points. This limitation comes from the fact that we only allow padding at the
flip-flops and, in theory, the intervening logic could be modified to have zero slack.
Note that when the SER of the circuits, was re-evaluated after the padding,
the TVF calculation was performed based on equation A.2, using the path with
the minimum propagation delay. It is possible that the approximation of the TVF
used as the cost function (equation A.7) results in a slightly non-optimal solution.
However, the reported reduction does indeed represent a valid solution. Further-
more, the additional SET contribution has been included, thus the reported value
represents a true net reduction.
Area and Power Constrainted Results To force the solver to find the best
SER reduction, within a given area or power budget (Amax or Pmax), an additional
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FF1
FF4
FF5
FF2
FF3
Figure A.7: Shared Timing Paths
constraint was added to the system. The system was repeatedly solved for increasing
values of Amax or Pmax and the results are shown in figures A.8 and A.9. The
vertical scale shows the net SER reduction. This accounts for the combinatorial
SER increase due to the added gates, thus the SER reduction in these graphs is
lower than that seen in table A.2.
For the s400 circuit, a reduction of about 40% in overall SER was possible with
a 5% area overhead. Beyond this point, the added combintorial SER from the
additional buffers starts to offset the benefit from reduced SEU SER. For larger
circuits (or1200), the SEU SER could be driven down further, with additional area
cost.
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Figure A.8: Area Constrained TVF Minimization
A.6 Conclusions
In this work, we have studied the extent to which the TVF of a circuit can be
intentionally reduced in order to minimize the flip-flop SER. The analysis considered
varied benchmark circuits and took into account the additional combinatorial SER
that results from the added logic gates. The proposed modifications do not impact
the critical timing paths.
It is well known that adding logic for delay padding is costly, as seen when fixing
hold time violations. As a result the proposed technique for SER reduction is inher-
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Figure A.9: Power Constrained TVF Minimization
ently less effective than approaches based on selective replacement with hardened
flip-flops [Evans 2013c, Ebrahimi 2014] where it is common to achieve a 5x SER
reduction by replacing fewer than 5% of the flip-flops.
The proposed technique might apply well in flash-based FPGAs, where the con-
figuration storage bits are already quite robust to radiation effects. For space ap-
plications, common practice is to triplicate flip-flops, which is very costly. Instead,
unused interconnect ressources could be used to insert padding, reducing the TVF
and thus minimizing flip-flop SER. In FPGAs, there is no area penalty associated
with the use of such unused resources, although it still impacts dynamic power.
In this work, we considered a single, typical timing condition. In terrestrial ap-
plications, what is important for SER analysis is the average value of TVF across
a large population of devices, thus evaluating TVF based on typical timing is rea-
sonable. When adapative voltage scaling (AVS) is used, the average timing slack in
the population is reduced and the typical timing may yield a conservative estimate
of the average TVF.
The approach to inserting delay proposed in this work consisted simply of adding
a chain of minimum sized buffers, which results in increased combinatorial SER.
Instead, a glitch-filter, of the type shown in figure A.10 can be used. Such a circuit
has the advantage that it adds delay, while also reducing combinatorial SER. Future
work will look at using optimization techniques to selectively insert glitch filters to
both simultaneously minimize TVF and reduce SETs.
Negative Glitch Filter Postive Glitch Filter
Figure A.10: Glitch Filter
We further note that in this cotribution, we formulated the problem based on
inserting delay at the input or the output of flip-flops, in order to reduce the size
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of the solution space. In some cases, it is more effective to insert delay in the
middle of the combinatorial logic (see figure A.3). Future work will look at how the
optimization problem can be generalized to consider a broader solution space.
In summary, optimization techniques to reduce SER subject to constraints on
acceptable penalties are attractive. The proposed technique provides the designer
with an additional tool for SER minimization when hardened flip-flops are not avail-
able.
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Techniques for the evaluation and the improvement of emergent
technologies’ behaviour facing random errors
Abstract: The main objective of this thesis is to develop analysis and mitigation
techniques that can be used to face the effects of radiation-induced soft errors -
external and internal disturbances produced by radioactive particles, affecting the
reliability and safety in operation complex microelectronic circuits. This thesis
aims to provide industrial solutions and methodologies for the areas of terrestrial
applications requiring ultimate reliability (telecommunications, medical devices, ...)
to complement previous work on Soft Errors traditionally oriented aerospace, nuclear
and military applications.
The work presented uses a decomposition of the error sources, inside the current
circuits, to highlight the most important contributors.
Single Event Effects in sequential logic cells represent the current target for anal-
ysis and improvement efforts in both industry and academia. This thesis presents
a state-aware analysis methodology that improves the accuracy of Soft Error Rate
data for individual sequential instances based on the circuit and application. Fur-
thermore, the intrinsic imbalance between the SEU susceptibility of different flip-flop
states is exploited to implement a low-cost SER improvement strategy.
Single Event Transients affecting combinational logic are considerably more dif-
ficult to model, simulate and analyze than the closely-related Single Event Upsets.
The working environment may cause a myriad of distinctive transient pulses in var-
ious cell types that are used in widely different configurations. This thesis presents
practical approach to a possible exhaustive Single Event Transient evaluation flow
in an industrial setting. The main steps of this process consists in: a) fully char-
acterize the standard cell library using a process and library-aware SER tool, b)
evaluate SET effects in the logic networks of the circuit using a variety dynamic
(simulation-based) and static (probabilistic) methods and c) compute overall SET
figures taking into account the particularities of the implementation of the circuit
and its environment.
Fault-injection remains the primary method for analyzing the effects of soft er-
rors. This document presents the results of functional analysis of a complex CPU.
Three representative benchmarks were considered for this analysis. Accelerated sim-
ulation techniques (probabilistic calculations, clustering, parallel simulations) have
been proposed and evaluated in order to develop an industrial validation environ-
ment, able to take into account very complex circuits. The results obtained allowed
the development and evaluation of a hypothetical mitigation scenario that aims to
significantly improve the reliability of the circuit at the lowest cost. The results
obtained show that the error rate, SDC (Silent Data Corruption) and DUE (De-
tectable Uncorrectable Errors) can be significantly reduced by hardening a small
part of the circuit (Selective mitigation).
In addition to the main axis of research, some tangential topics were studied in
collaboration with other teams. One of these consisted in the study of a technique
for the mitigation of flip-flop soft-errors through an optimization of the Temporal
De-Rating (TDR) by selectively inserting delay on the input or output of flip-flops.
The Methodologies, the algorithms and the CAD tools proposed and validated
as part of the work are intended for industrial use and have been included in a com-
mercial CAD framework that offers a complete solution for assessing the reliability
of circuits and complex electronic systems.
Keywords: Single-Event Effects, Single-Event Upsets, Single-Event Transients,
Soft Errors, Fault-Injection, Selective Mitigation
ISBN: 978-2-11-129206-2
Techniques pour l’évaluation et l’amélioration du comportement
des technologies émergentes face aux fautes aléatoires
Abstract: L’objectif principal de cette thèse est de développer des techniques
d’analyse et mitigation capables à contrer les effets des Evènements Singuliers (Sin-
gle Event Effects) - perturbations externes et internes produites par les partic-
ules radioactives, affectant la fiabilité et la sureté en fonctionnement des circuits
microélectroniques complexes. Cette thèse à la vocation d’offrir des solutions et
méthodologies industrielles pour les domaines d’applications terrestres exigeant une
fiabilité ultime (télécommunications, dispositifs médicaux, ...) en complément des
travaux précédents sur les Soft Errors, traditionnellement orientés vers les applica-
tions aérospatiales, nucléaires et militaires.
Les travaux présentés utilisent une décomposition de sources d’erreurs dans les
circuits actuels, visant à mettre en évidence les contributeurs les plus importants.
Les upsets (SEU) - Evènements Singuliers (ES) dans les cellules logiques séquen-
tielles représentent actuellement la cible principale pour les efforts d’analyse et
d’amélioration à la fois dans l’industrie et dans l’académie. Cette thèse présente
une méthodologie d’analyse basée sur la prise en compte de la sensibilité de chaque
état logique d’une cellule (state-awareness), approche qui améliore considérablement
la précision des résultats concernant les taux des évènements pour les instances
séquentielles individuelles. En outre, le déséquilibre intrinsèque entre la susceptibil-
ité des différents états des bascules est exploité pour mettre en œuvre une stratégie
d’amélioration SER à très faible coût.
Les fautes transitoires (SET) affectant la logique combinatoire sont beaucoup
plus difficiles à modéliser, à simuler et à analyser que les SEUs. L’environnement
radiatif peut provoquer une multitude d’impulsions transitoires dans les divers types
de cellules qui sont utilisés en configurations multiples. Cette thèse présente une
approche pratique pour l’analyse SET, applicable à des circuits industriels très
complexes. Les principales étapes de ce processus consiste à: a) caractériser com-
plètement la bibliothèque de cellules standard, b) évaluer les SET dans les réseaux
logiques du circuit en utilisant des méthodes statiques et dynamiques et c) calculer
le taux SET global en prenant en compte les particularités de l’implémentation du
circuit et de son environnement.
L’injection de fautes reste la principale méthode d’analyse pour étudier l’impact
des fautes, erreurs et disfonctionnements causés par les évènements singuliers. Ce
document présente les résultats d’une analyse fonctionnelle d’un processeur com-
plexe dans la présence des fautes et pour une sélection d’applications (benchmarks)
représentatifs. Des techniques d’accélération de la simulation (calculs probabilistes,
clustering, simulations parallèles) ont été proposées et évalués afin d’élaborer un
environnement de validation industriel, capable à prendre en compte des circuits
très complexes. Les résultats obtenus ont permis l’élaboration et l’évaluation d’un
hypothétique scénario de mitigation qui vise à améliorer sensiblement, et cela au
moindre coût, la fiabilité du circuit sous test. Les résultats obtenus montrent que
les taux d’erreur, SDC (Silent Data Corruption) et DUE (Detectable Uncorrectable
Errors) peuvent être considérablement réduits par le durcissement d’un petite partie
du circuit (protection sélective).
D’autres techniques spécifiques ont été également déployées: mitigation du taux
de soft-errors des Flip-Flips grâce à une optimisation du Temporal De-Rating par
l’insertion sélective de retard sur l’entrée ou la sortie des bascules et biasing du
circuit pour privilégier les états moins sensibles.
Les méthodologies, algorithmes et outils CAO proposés et validés dans le cadre
de ces travaux sont destinés à un usage industriel et ont été valorisés dans le cadre de
plateforme CAO commerciale visant à offrir une solution complète pour l’évaluation
de la fiabilité des circuits et systèmes électroniques complexes.
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1.1 Introduction
L’introduction est organisée en deux parties. La première partie présente une
vue d’ensemble des différents environnements radiatifs : l’environnement spatial
et l’environnement terrestre. La deuxième partie présente une classification et les
mécanismes de déclenchement des principaux Evènements Singuliers (Single Event
Effects - SEE).
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1.1.1 Les Environnements Radiatifs
1.1.1.1 L’Environnement Spatial
L’environnement spatial (Figure 1.1) est un milieu assez hostile pour les équipements
électroniques car on peut y rencontrer trois sources de radiation :
1. Les particules emprisonnées par le champ magnétique de la terre (les ceintures
de radiations)
• Particules à haute énergie (rayonnements cosmiques et particules solaires)
qui ne sont pas déviées par le champ magnétique de la terre et qui se
retrouvent emprisonnées par ce dernier.
2. Les rayonnements cosmiques galactiques (GCR)
• Particules à haute énergie provenant de l’extérieur du système solaire
3. Les particules solaires
• Particules à haute énergie (principalement protons et particules alphas)
éjectées par le soleil (vent solaire, éruptions solaires, ...).
Magnetosphere
Van Allen Belt
Figure 1.1: L’environnement spatial
1.1.1.2 L’Environnement Atmosphérique
L’environnement atmosphérique (ou terrestre) est sensiblement moins agressif
que l’environnement spatial. Une importante partie des rayons cosmiques et des
particules solaires est filtrée par le champ magnétique terrestre (Figure ??). En-
suite, les particules primaires restantes interagissent avec les atomes de l’atmosphère
(Figure ??), ces interactions vont engendrer une multitude de particules secondaires
(neutrons, protons, muons, pions, électrons, ...), qui sont prédominants aux altitudes
de vol d’avions mais qui peuvent aussi atteindre le sol.
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Figure 1.2: Interaction des Rayons Cosmiques avec les atomes de l’atmosphère
1.1.1.3 Les Particules Alpha
Une autre source de particules ionisantes qu’on peut rencontrer au niveau ter-
restre provient de la désintégration radioactive d’atomes lourds, présents en très
faible quantité dans tous les matériaux (utilisés pour le packaging des circuits inté-
grés). La désintégration radioactive (Figure 1.3) de ces atomes peut en particulier
émettre des particules ionisantes comme les particules alpha qui peuvent générer
des erreurs.
1.1.2 Les Événements Singuliers
Les événements singuliers (Single Event Effects - SEE) proviennent de l’interaction
d’une particule énergétique avec un circuit microélectronique (Figure 1.4). Les par-
ticules ou les radiations ionisantes ont le pouvoir d’arracher ou d’exciter les électrons
des atomes de la matière qu’elles traversent. Cette perturbation peut modifier d’une
manière imprévue le fonctionnement d’un circuit électronique.
Les événements singuliers peuvent engendrer des effets permanents, irréversibles
ou des effets réversibles, non destructifs. Parmi les effets non destructifs on peut
citer:
• le Single Event Transient (SET) ou Single Event Multiple Transient (SEMT)
• le Single Event Upset (SEU) ou Single Event Multiple Upset (SEMU)
• le Single Bit Upset (SBU), Multi Cell Upset (MCU) et Multi Bit Upset (MBU)
pour les mémoires
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Figure 1.3: Les désintégrations radioactives
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Figure 1.4: Méthodes d’interactions de particules : Ionisation Directe et Indirecte
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• le Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI)
• le Single Event Latchup (SEL)
Parmi les effets permanents on peut citer:
• le Single Event Burnout (SEB)
• le Single Event induced Snapback (SES)
• le Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR)
1.2 Analyse des Evènements Singuliers
L’Analyse de l’impact des fautes induites par des Soft Erreurs (SE) dans les
circuits intégrés reste difficile. La grande majorité des fautes ne se propagent pas (ou
effets de masquage) en raison des effets de blocage. La section suivante présente les
trois étapes principales d’une méthodologie d’analyse Soft Erreurs: la caractérisation
de la technologie, les effets de blocage et enfin le calcul du taux d’erreur global d’un
circuit.
1.2.1 Caractérisation de la Technologie
La caractérisation de la technologie SER est la première étape de la méthode
d’analyse SER présentée. Les données SER brutes devraient être fournies en termes
de probabilité/taux d’occurrence pour un environnement spécifique.
1.2.2 Effets de Blocage
1.2.2.1 Blocage Électrique
Le blocage électrique quantifie l’atténuation électrique d’un SET et donc sa
capacité de se propager à travers le réseau combinatoire.
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Figure 1.5: Blocage Électrique
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1.2.2.2 Blocage Logique
Le blocage logique consiste à évaluer la propagation de l’erreur logique de la
sortie de la cellule affectée aux entrées d’une cellule séquentielle ou mémoire. Selon
l’état du circuit (les valeurs des signaux et des sorties de cellules), la propagation
de l’erreur est soumise à un blocage de la logique. C’est le cas, par exemple, d’une
faute qui se propage jusqu’à l’entrée A d’une cellule de type AND. Si la valeur du
signal sur l’entrée B est 0, la sortie de la porte sera 0 indifféremment de la valeur
du signal sur l’entrée A
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Figure 1.6: Blocage Logique
1.2.2.3 Blocage Temporel
Le blocage temporel est lié au concept de fenêtre d’opportunité temporelle d’une
faute (SET ou SEU) d’être mémorisé dans une cellule séquentielle ou mémoire.
Si la faute n’est pas d’échantillonnée dans un registre ou une cellule de mémoire,
elle n’aura aucun impact sur le fonctionnement du circuit. Le concept de blocage
temporel change selon le type de faute considéré :
• Un SEU, pour se propager, doit arriver dans le registre concerné au début de
la période d’horloge pour se propager à travers le réseau logique et d’atteindre
le prochain étage séquentiel.
• Un SET doit provoquer une valeur incorrecte sur l’entrée d’une cellule séquen-
tielle ou mémoire pendant la fenêtre d’échantillonnage.
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Figure 1.8: Blocage Temporel des SETs
1.2.2.4 Blocage Fonctionnel
Le blocage fonctionnel évalue si un soft erreur a un impact visible sur le fonc-
tionnement du circuit, d’une carte ou d’un système. Il prend en compte l’utilisation
réelle du circuit et le fonctionnement du système.
1.2.2.5 Blocage des Mémoires
Le blocage des mémoires représente la portion de temps pendant lequel les
données stockées dans une mémoire finiront par être lues et donc utilisées par
l’application. Cette métrique est appelée fenêtre de vulnérabilité et elle correspond
au temps entre un accès en écriture à une adresse et le dernier accès en lecture à
cette adresse avant la fin de la simulation ou devant un autre accès en écriture à
cette adresse.
1.2.3 Calcul du Taux d’Erreur Global d’un Circuit
Le calcul du taux d’erreur global d’un circuit combine les données de sensibilité
de la technologie (Caractérisation de la technologie) avec les informations concernant
la propagation des fautes et leurs effets sur l’application.
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1.3 Analyse des Evènements Singuliers Transitoires
Les évènements singuliers transitoires (SET) affectant la logique combinatoire
sont beaucoup plus difficiles à modéliser, simuler et analyser que les évènements
singuliers upset (SEU). L’environnement de travail peut provoquer une multitude
d’impulsions transitoires distinctives dans divers types de cellules qui sont utilisés
largement dans différentes configurations.
Ce chapitre présente un flow détaillé d’analyse SET dans un cadre industriel.
Cette méthode d’analyse consiste en trois étapes principales :
1. La première étape concerne la caractérisation de la technologie
• L’outil TFIT a été utilisé pour caractériser la bibliothèque Open-Cell
Nangate 45nm. Pour chaque cellule, les effets des neutrons et des partic-
ules alpha ont été étudiés.
2. La deuxième étape concerne l’analyse de la propagation de la SET
• Cette tâche inclut le calcul du blocage logique (Logic De-Rating -LDR),
du blocage temporel (Temporal De-Rating - TDR) et du blocage élec-
trique (Electrical De-Rating - EDR). Pour ce dernier une analyse de la
déformation de l’impulsion a aussi été présentée.
• Le circuit considéré pour l’analyse est un Multiplieur-FP (Floating Point),
synthétisé avec la bibliothèque Open-Cell Nangate 45nm.
3. Enfin, le SER-SET global est calculé en tenant compte des particularités de
la mise en œuvre du circuit et de son environnement.
Les résultats indiquent que le SER-SET (logique combinatoire) est habituellement,
de plusieurs fois inférieur par rapport au SER-SEU (logique séquentielle) à cause de
un très fort blocage temporel et électrique.
En outre, comme contribution supplémentaire, ce chapitre présente les résultats
d’une analyse paramétrique du SET-SER en mettant en évidence les facteurs qui
influencent la sensibilité SET :
• Cell Drive Strength : la sensibilité SET globale diminue à l’augmentation du
drive strenght. Pour les portes logiques non-inversantes (buffer, and, or, ...)
la sensibilité SET diminue pour des courtes impulsions mais augmente pour
des longues (Figures 1.9 et 1.10).
• Output Load Capacitance : la sensibilité SET globale diminue à l’augmentation
du output load pour des courtes impulsions et reste constante pour des longues
(Figure 1.11).
• Supply Voltage : la sensibilité SET globale diminue à l’augmentation du Sup-
ply Voltage pour des longues impulsions et reste constante pour des courtes
(Figure 1.12).
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1.4 Analyse des Evènements Singuliers dan la logique
séquentielle
Les upsets (SEU) - Evènements Singuliers spécifiques pour la logique séquen-
tielle - représentent actuellement la cible principale pour les efforts d’analyse et
d’amélioration à la fois dans l’industrie et dans l’académie.
Cette section présente une méthodologie d’analyse basée sur la prise en compte
de la sensibilité de chaque état logique d’une cellule (state-awareness), approche
qui améliore considérablement la précision des résultats concernant les taux des
d’évènements pour les instances séquentielles individuelles. Cette section montre
qu’en utilisant une valeur de SER moyenne (pour les 8 états) on peut introduire
une erreur considérable dans le calcul du SER global d’un circuit. Pour le cas de
l’étude considérée (un microprocesseur industriel - ∼ 190, 000 flip-flops), en utilisant
un SER-SEU moyen on introduit une erreur de presque 10% (sous-estimée) du SER
global du circuit.
Les données SER plus détaillées ont été ensuite utilisées pour proposer des nou-
velles techniques de calcul du TDR, pour les flip-flops master-slave.
Le déséquilibre intrinsèque entre la susceptibilité SEU des différents états des flip-
flops est exploité pour mettre en œuvre une stratégie d’amélioration de SER-SEU
à faible coût (Figure 1.13). Cette technique a été évaluée avec un microprocesseur
industriel (∼ 190, 000 flip-flops - ∼ 1, 200, 000 portes combinatoires), la probabilité
d’état pour chaque cellule séquentielle a été obtenue par simulation. Le SER-SEU
peut être diminué de ∼ 20% (de 76.1 FIT à 61.4 FIT) (tableaux 1.1 et 1.2), en
ajoutant ∼ 70, 000 inverseurs, qui représentent mois de 1% de surcoût en surface.
Table 1.1: SER du microprocesseur avant protection
% of time storing "0" Instance Count SER @ 0 SER @ 1
0% 31697 15.6 0
5% 3872 1.8 0
10% 4451 2 0.1
... ... ... ...
95% 4029 0.1 0.9
100% 31732 0 7.4
TOTAL SER
58.4 17.7
76.1
En outre, comme contribution supplémentaire, ce chapitre présente les résultats
d’une analyse SET effectuée pour les cellules séquentielles. L’intérêt de cet effort
est d’abord, d’évaluer la sensibilité des parties combinatoires (buffers de sortie, in-
verseurs internes, etc.) de la cellule séquentielle et, deuxièmement, d’examiner si
un SET est possible dans la boucle de mémorisation interne lorsqu’elle est bloquée
(mémorisation). Les résultats obtenus avec l’outil TFIT pour un D-Latch, montrent
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Figure 1.13: Optimisation par l’inversion d’état
Table 1.2: SER du microprocesseur après protection
% of time storing "0" Instance Count SER @ 0 SER @ 1
0% 31697 7.4 0
5% 3872 0.9 0.1
10% 4451 0.9 0.2
... ... ... ...
95% 4029 0.1 0.9
100% 31732 0 7.4
TOTAL SER
42.2 19.2
61.4
une différence très importante (∼ 3.5X) entre l’état transparent (clock high - plus
sensible) et l’état mémorisation (clock low - moins sensible).
1.5 Analyse de-rating d’un microprocesseur
L’injection de fautes reste la principale méthode d’analyse pour étudier l’impact
des fautes, erreurs et disfonctionnements causés par les évènements singuliers. Cette
section présente les résultats d’une analyse fonctionnelle d’un processeur complexe
en présence des fautes et pour une sélection d’applications (benchmarks) représen-
tatifs. Des techniques de simulation accélérée (calculs probabilistes, clustering, sim-
ulations parallèles) ont été proposés et évalués afin de développer un environnement
de validation industrielle, capable de prendre en compte les circuits très complexes
avec des efforts raisonnables (main-d’œuvre et de temps CPU).
Le LDR a été calculé en utilisant une technique appelée PPSFP (Parallel Pattern
Single Fault Propagation) en utilisant des vecteurs d’entrées aléatoires (Figure 1.14).
Les analyses dynamiques (par simulation) (MDR et FDR) ont été effectuées en
utilisant trois applications de la suite MiBench :
• L’algorithme Quick Sort
• Une série d’opérations mathématiques
• Plusieurs algorithmes de bitcount
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Figure 1.14: Distribution des valeurs de Blocage Logique des Flip-Flop (Moyenne
LDR = 74.1%)
Pour chaque application, trois campagnes d’injection de faute ont été effectuées. Une
première campagne d’injection de faute a permis le calcul d’un facteur FDR initial.
Une deuxième campagne d’injection de faute basée sur une approche de clustering,
a permis une meilleure caractérisation (pour chaque instance) du processeur. Enfin,
une dernière campagne d’injection de faute a permis l’évaluation d’un scénario de
mitigation d’erreur hypothétique mis en œuvre en utilisant les données obtenues à
partir de la première et de la deuxième campagne d’injection de faute.
Les résultats obtenus montrent que les taux d’erreurs, à la fois de la SDC (Silent
Data Corruption) et DUE (Detectable Uncorrectable Errors), peuvent être consid-
érablement réduits par le durcissement d’un pourcentage limité de flip-flop. Pour le
processeur considéré (∼ 250, 000 flip-flops), en exécutant seulement 90, 000 fautes,
on a pu montrer une réductions d’un facteur 5 du taux d’erreurs (SDC et DUE) en
durcissant ∼ 10% des flip-flops (Figure 1.15).
1.6 Annexe: Flip-Flop SEU Reduction through Mini-
mization of the Temporal Vulnerability Factor (TVF)
L’annexe présente les résultats d’un projet de recherche en collaboration entre
IROC Technologies et Intel Israel. Le contenu est basé sur une publication qui a été
présenté à la conférence IOLTS 2015.
Cette section présente une technique d’amélioration du taux de soft-erreurs des
flip-flips grâce à une optimisation du blocage temporel (Temporal De-Rating - TDR
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Figure 1.15: Reduction du taux SDC et DUE pour chaque application
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ou TVF) par l’insertion sélective de délais (implémenté avec des buffers) sur l’entrée
ou la sortie des flip-flops. Le blocage temporel (TDR) dans son expression la plus
simple est défini comme le slack divisé par la période d’horloge : c’est donc évident
que les chemins critiques sont les moins sensibles et les chemins plus relaxés sont les
plus sensibles.
La technique proposée vise à réduire le slack, donc augmenter le blocage tem-
porel, pour les chemins plus relaxés , en ajoutant des délais (buffer). L’implémentation
de la technique d’optimisation a été proposé comme un problème de programmation
linéaire afin de pouvoir considérer des contraintes de surface et power. La technique
a été évaluée avec plusieurs circuits (relativement simples) et les résultats obtenus
montrent des réductions du SER global (SEU et SET - la contribution des buffers
à été considérée) entre 20% et 50% avec un surcoût en surface de ∼ 10%.
